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ABSTRACT 
Army installations have been uniquely affected by the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT) and homeland security initiatives as a result of the attacks on 
September 11, 2001.  Unfortunately, most have not done enough in coordinating 
and integrating their antiterrorism plans with the crisis response and 
consequence management plans of their adjacent civilian municipalities.  This 
thesis argues that fences and guards are not enough to protect Army installations 
against terrorist attack, or against any other natural or man-made disaster, nor do 
installations have the wherewithal to respond effectively on their own should 
disaster strike.  Doctrine is clear, and regulations and policy have been published 
guiding the Army (and other military services) in providing Civil Support to state 
and local authorities during times of crisis; but what is less clear, or more 
precisely, non-existent, is the doctrine regarding how Army installations would 
receive and integrate support from local and state officials in response to 
disasters occurring on the installation.  Now more than ever, Army installations 
require municipal support to effectively respond to terrorist attacks, natural 
disasters, and accidents.  Indeed, Army installations must reach across their 
perimeter fences and embrace municipal partners in integrating force protection 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES 
Army installations have been uniquely affected by the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT) and homeland security initiatives as a result of the attacks on 
September 11, 2001.  Unfortunately, most have not done enough in coordinating 
and integrating their antiterrorism and force protection plans with the crisis 
response and consequence management plans of their adjacent civilian 
municipalities.  Army installations can no longer view themselves as island 
fortresses with respect to force protection.  It is time to fill in the moat of 
misperception and gaps in communication separating Army installations from 
civilian municipalities.  Now more than ever, Army installations require municipal 
support to effectively respond to terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and 
accidents.  Indeed, Army installations must reach across their perimeter fences 
and embrace municipal partners in integrating force protection with homeland 
security.       
For the past several years, the U.S. Army has made a concerted effort to 
re-secure its installations against a variety of threats, ranging from an overly 
inquisitive public to surprise terrorist attacks.  The term “re-secure” is used 
intentionally, because for some time in our nation’s past, Army installations were 
fortresses of a sort—heavily guarded and patrolled—with access granted only to 
those working within, plus their families (if they resided in post housing), as well 
as to those visitors pre-approved by the installation commanders.  Following the 
advent of the post-Vietnam, all-volunteer force, the Army opened most of its 
installations (especially those within the continental U.S.) to the public.  This 
effort at exposing typical Army life to average Americans was a great public 
relations initiative and a boon to recruiting.  However, over the past quarter-
century military commanders have been tragically reminded of their force 
protection responsibilities, beginning with the truck bombing of the U.S. Marine 
Corps contingent at the Beirut, Lebanon airport in 1983.  The attack against the 
2 
U.S. Air Force at Khobar Towers in 1996, the attack against the U.S. Marine 
guards (and many civilians) at the two U.S. Embassies in Africa in 1998, and the 
attack against the USS Cole suffered by the U.S. Navy in 2000, are more recent 
reminders that resulted in a renewed military emphasis on force protection.   
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which united Americans for the first time 
since World War II in an all out effort against a global threat, federal, state, and 
municipal officials throughout the country began embracing the notion of 
homeland security.  The Defense Department launched GWOT, with retaliatory 
attacks against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the war of 
liberation in Iraq; while back home, the creation of both the Department of 
Homeland Security and the Department of Defense’s Northern Command 
(NORTHCOM) have had far reaching implications for federal, state, and 
municipal officials charged with defending the homeland.  
B. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
This thesis is offered as a catalyst, provoking others to contribute to an 
emerging body of knowledge on municipal support to military installations—more 
specifically, how support from local municipalities enhances the ability of Army 
installations to deter and defend against attacks, and to respond effectively 
should they occur.  The literature available on the subject of Army installations 
and homeland security is focused on the reverse situation—defense support of 
civil authorities.  Most of these sources are military publications, RAND 
Corporation publications, or General Accounting Office (GAO) reports.   
C. HYPOTHESIS/POLICY OPTIONS 
Over the past quarter century, the Army’s installation force protection 
program has focused almost exclusively on antiterrorism—actions necessary to 
prevent or deter a terrorist attack, primarily emphasizing the physical security of 
installations and facilities.  Although this suggests that the Army has been 
proactive in its approach, history shows differently.  Army antiterrorism policy and 
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corresponding programs have, in fact, been driven by reaction to previous 
attacks, resulting in an inefficient and inconsistent application of resources and 
personnel amid cycles of complacency (Figure 1).   
The 1983 attack on the U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters in Beirut, 
hastened the publication of Army Regulation (AR) 190-52, Terrorism 
Counteraction, a regulation oriented on the law enforcement aspects of 
responding to terrorist attacks (e.g., hostage negotiations and special reaction 
team operations).  In three short years, with no intervening attacks against 
military targets, complacency set in.  A 1986 Department of the Army Inspector 
General (DAIG) inspection led to increased antiterrorism emphasis, and revision 
of the regulation.  The 1988 version, AR 525-13, Combating Terrorism, refocused 
the Army’s energy toward deterring and preventing terrorist attacks, rather than 
reacting to them after they occur.  Again, complacency struck and another DAIG 


















































Figure 1.   History of the U.S. Army Antiterrorism Program1 
                                            
1 Craig Benedict, “Army Antiterrorism Program Status,” unpublished briefing from HQ, 
Department of the Army, G-3/5/7 (DAMO-ODL), presented at the Garrison Pre-command Course, 
Army Management Staff College, Fort Belvoir, VA, August 5, 2004, slide 16. 
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The Downing Commission Report following the 1996 Khobar Towers 
attack was critical of many aspects of the military’s combating terrorism program.  
Among other things, this report recommended more command emphasis on 
antiterrorism, which it described as a “focus on offensive and defensive means to 
preempt, deter, or thwart terrorist attacks on U.S. servicemen and women, their 
families, and facilities and mitigate damage when attacks succeed.”2  A follow-on 
assessment of its own combating terrorism program by Headquarters, 
Department of the Army (HQDA) led to another revision of AR 525-13, including 
renaming it Antiterrorism/Force Protection.  This version of the regulation 
introduced the AT/FP acronym which led to confusion in terminology that still 
exists to this day.   
There are several problems with the Army’s approach to installation force 
protection over the last 25 years.  First, as demonstrated in the preceding 
paragraphs, the Army has struggled with terminology.  What is force protection?  
What is antiterrorism?  Secondly, the Army’s emphasis within antiterrorism has 
been on only two of its four aspects:  prevention and deterrence.  Hundreds of 
millions of dollars have been spent annually on fences, lighting, surveillance 
cameras, security guards, and other access control barriers in an effort to make 
Army installations more secure against possible terrorist attacks.  Although well 
intentioned and beneficial to the Army’s antiterrorism goals, these visible and 
tangible actions have only addressed part of the need.  With much of the less 
available funding being spent in a reactive fashion on physical security, little 
attention has been paid on response and recovery actions after an attack occurs.  
While it could be argued that if the first two are successful, more emphasis on 
these latter two aspects is not necessary, former Army Chief of Staff, General 
Eric K. Shinseki, cautioned over six months before the terrorist attack on the USS 
Cole in October 2000:  
                                            
2 Report to the President and Congress on the Protection of U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad, 
Annex A: The Downing Investigation Report, (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of 
Defense, August 30, 1996), 7; available on the Internet at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/downing/ 
report.pdf (accessed on February 25, 2005). 
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Commanders must, as the law and available resources permit… 
establish procedures to enable effective response to save lives and 
contain damage if an attack does occur. Traditionally, AT/FP 
programs have relied on physical security measures to deter and 
defend against possible attack. Use of such measures should 
certainly continue. But there is another dimension of antiterrorism: 
of actively using information technology and human expertise to 
gain an understanding of terrorist motives and operational patterns, 
and actively engaging in the environment in which terrorists may 
operate.3 
Although some minor improvements have occurred, the Army has made 
little real progress in this other dimension of antiterrorism: specifically, an organic 
intelligence capability that uses both human and technological means to assess 
a potential enemy’s capacity to execute an attack against a specific installation.    
A third problem is a lack of command influence in the antiterrorism and 
force protection areas.  Army installation commanders have the responsibility for 
antiterrorism and force protection on their respective installations with the day-to-
day execution of these programs delegated to their garrison commanders.  
Competing priorities (led by the fact that the U.S. is currently a nation still at war), 
limited resources both in dollars and personnel, and complacency (due to several 
consecutive years without a successful terrorist attack against the U.S. at home 
or abroad), have caused commanders to divert resources and their personal 
attention away from antiterrorism and force protection, towards other, more 
pressing priorities.  As a result, required antiterrorism planning, vulnerability 
assessments, and training exercises are not being executed to standard, nor is 
there any uniformity across the Army with respect to antiterrorism and force 
protection doctrine, as none has yet been developed.   
The emergence of “homeland security” (the term itself and the cabinet 
department) into the daily lexicon of average Americans poses another challenge 
for Army installations.  What is the relationship between antiterrorism, force 
protection, and homeland security?  Are homeland defense and homeland 
security different terms, or just different ways of saying the same thing?  How 
                                            
3 United States Army Antiterrorism and Force Protection Installation Commanders’ Guide, 
(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, March 2000), 3.  
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well do Army installations respond to crises that are not the result of terrorist 
attacks?  How do the efforts of the Department of Homeland Security with 
respect to the emergency response capabilities of municipalities square with the 
force protection requirements and response capabilities of Army installations?  
How should the National Incident Management System (NIMS) be incorporated 
into Army installation force protection programs? 
I begin this research effort believing that the Army has an acknowledged 
role in homeland security that is focused on two elements:  homeland defense 
and civil support.  In both of these elements, Army installations provide base 
operations and other logistical support to tenant units called upon to execute 
these missions.  Additionally, the Army has a force protection mission, defined 
broadly as the security of its installations, to include the soldiers and family 
members residing on post, and the civil servants and contractors working there.  
Where the Army has heretofore maintained a separation between homeland 
security and force protection, I will argue that force protection must be linked to 
homeland security, and that this linkage requires special emphasis from 
installation and garrison commanders. 
It is time for the Army to take a step back from its singular focus on 
antiterrorism, and seek to integrate its installation force protection programs with 
the emergency response programs of adjacent municipalities.  Looking beyond 
the physical security aspects of antiterrorism, and their own internal resources 
and capabilities, Army installations must coordinate intelligence analysis and 
dissemination, individual security awareness, and crisis response and 
consequence management activities with their respective municipal partners 
using an all-hazards approach.  Indeed, whether an installation is attacked, or 
suffers a natural disaster, accident, or severe weather event, municipal support 
to military installations will be absolutely essential in quickly restoring military 
operational capability, and in returning services, infrastructure, and supporting 
facilities to normalcy as rapidly as possible. 
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Since the 9/11 attacks, the Army has made some progress in these areas 
at the corporate or headquarters level.  In response to Department of the Army 
Inspector General (DAIG) and Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports 
rendered over the past decade, the Army has refined its process for allocating 
antiterrorism funds, developed an antiterrorism strategic plan, and revised its 
antiterrorism regulation.  The advent of NORTHCOM, and its Army component, 
US Army, North (ARNORTH) has improved the Army’s ability to respond to all-
hazards emergencies and to provide support to FEMA and other civil authorities 
when needed.  The consolidation of Army installation management under a 
single command has also contributed to improved standardization and execution 
of antiterrorism and force protection programs.   
The aim of this research effort is to show that although significant energy 
and resources have been expended at the corporate level of the Army to improve 
antiterrorism and force protection policy; these efforts have not translated into 
fully implemented and responsive programs at the installation level, where 
soldiers, their families, and the installation’s civilian staff are directly affected.  
Furthermore, the Army is only now beginning to embrace the all-hazards 
emergency management approach espoused by the Department of Homeland 
Security, and in various stages of implementation in municipalities throughout the 
U.S.  This thesis includes a discussion of how the Army Management Staff 
College (AMSC) led the Army’s efforts to integrate installation force protection 
with municipal homeland security by developing and implementing a training and 
exercise program that seeks to move installations beyond deterring and 
preventing terrorist attacks to anticipating, responding to, and recovering from all-
hazards crisis events that could strike at any moment.  This comprehensive 
program includes over 30 hours of antiterrorism, force protection, and emergency 
response curriculum added to its Command Programs resident courses since 
early 2002, as well as the on-site Installation Force Protection Exercise (IFPEX) 
program for garrison commanders and staffs, launched in the fall of 2006. 
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D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
The vehicle for supporting the argument that Army installation force 
protection must be integrated with municipal homeland security is a case study of 
Carlisle Barracks’ experience with the IFPEX program.  Carlisle Barracks is the 
home of the U.S. Army War College, and is located in south central 
Pennsylvania.  The garrison commander at Carlisle Barracks used the IFPEX 
program to enhance his installation’s ability to respond, in conjunction with local 
municipal partners, to a severe weather event scenario, and later to a simulated 
terrorist attack using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device.   
Since its inception, almost 70 Army installations world-wide, representing 
the Active Component, the Army Reserves, and the Army National Guard, have 
completed the IFPEX program.  The IFPEX experience provided each of these 
installations a greater appreciation of the challenges they face in effectively 
coordinating antiterrorism/force protection and crisis response/consequence 
management plans and actions with their adjacent municipalities.  More 
importantly, installation staffs and their municipal colleagues have built 
relationships of trust and understanding, and improved procedures and practices 
that will serve them well when faced with an actual crisis event. 
Before discussing the Carlisle Barracks case, it is necessary to acquaint 
the reader with how the service and support functions of Army installations are 
structured.  The following chapter introduces the major players within Army 
installation management, and what their responsibilities and relationships are.  
Additionally, the role of the U.S. Army Installation Management Agency (IMA) is 
explained.   
Chapter III discusses force protection on Army installations (as opposed to 
the protection of forces deployed in combat theaters), and the distinction made 
by DoD between antiterrorism and force protection.  The “Commander’s Eight 
Critical Antiterrorism Tasks,” contained in Army Regulation 525-13, are examined 
and correlated to similar functions performed by local municipalities within their 
emergency management structures.   
9 
In Chapter IV, Homeland Security is defined from a military perspective 
and distinguished from Homeland Defense. The U.S. Northern Command 
(USNORTHCOM) is introduced and its missions summarized, followed by a 
discussion of how the Army mission of force protection contributes to homeland 
security.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of the Army’s effort to 
embrace the National Incident Management System (NIMS) to facilitate improved 
cooperation with local first responders and emergency managers in executing 
Defense Support of Civil Authorities missions and when receiving support from 
municipalities during crises occurring on Army installations.    
The Carlisle Barracks case study is contained in Chapter V.  This chapter 
provides the historical context for the development of the IFPEX program, which 
traces its roots back to the weeks immediately following the 9/11 attacks.  This 
chapter also contains a review of how the force protection curriculum of the 
Command Programs courses at the Army Management Staff College transitioned 
from an antiterrorism focus to the more desirable all-hazards approach to 
emergency management.  
As governor of California, former president Ronald Reagan once said, 
“Governments tend not to solve problems, only rearrange them.”4  The 
concluding chapter will emphasize that in homeland security, we must do more 
than proverbially rearrange deck chairs on the Titanic.  More than seven years 
after the 9/11 attacks, with the war in Iraq and other GWOT activities continuing 
indefinitely, it is imperative that Army installations fully embrace the integration of 
force protection and homeland security, working in close partnership with their 
respective municipalities to deter and prevent terrorist attacks, and to mitigate the 
potentially disastrous effects of any that may occur.  
Homeland Defense and Civil Support missions are performed primarily by 
the Army; however, Army installations also require significant support from 
civilian municipalities to execute their internal force protection responsibilities.  
There are elements of civilian homeland security programs, particularly in 
                                            
4 Statement made in 1973; available on the Internet at http://www.allthingswilliam.com/ 
presidents/reagan.html (accessed on December 14, 2004). 
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criminal intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination; first response efforts; 
and consequence management that can enhance the force protection efforts of 
installations.  Likewise, there are elements of Army antiterrorism programs such 
as access control, public education and awareness, vulnerability assessments, 
threat intelligence, and emergency management training and exercises that 
would be beneficial to municipalities.  In these exchanges, the scales are tipped 
against Army installations—municipalities do not require as much from 
installations as they are asked to provide to them.  While good fences do make 
good neighbors, Army installations must reach across them now more than ever 

























II. ARMY INSTALLATIONS 
A. BASIC FUNCTIONS AND FUNDING   
Army installations provide three basic functions in support of the overall 
Army mission: power projection (training and deploying forces from the 
installation to the fight), force protection (installation security and defense), and 
sustainment of the force (resources, people, infrastructure, and facilities).  While 
no two Army installations are alike, their garrison commanders are each 
responsible for these six base operations (BASOPS) areas:  resource 
management, civilian personnel management, facilities and infrastructure 
management, environmental stewardship, morale, welfare and recreation (MWR) 
programs, and force protection.  
Funding for installations is distributed through the Operations and 
Maintenance, Army (OMA) account (Figure 2).  Funds in the Mission “bag” pay 
for such things as training, readiness, and contingency operations (most of the 
power projection category), while those in the Base Support “bag” fund facilities, 
infrastructure, and other support functions (mostly in the force protection and 
sustainment categories).  Prior to October 2002, OMA funds were controlled by 
the Major Army Commands (MACOMs), allowing those commanders to shift 
funds back and forth between the Mission and Base Support bags, based on 
where their needs were greatest. 
As there were (and still are) never enough funds to fully fund both sides in 
any given fiscal year, MACOM commanders would routinely migrate funds from 
Base Support to Mission accounts to ensure that their forces were ready for war, 
or any other contingency.  Rarely did funds migrate the other way (from Mission 
to Base Support), leaving facilities and support programs under-funded and 
impacting retention rates as soldiers and their families began to demand 
(deservedly so) a higher quality of life in exchange for their service to the nation.  
The migration of funds also led to many purchasing and accounting  
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inefficiencies, and contributed to a persistent perception throughout the Army of 
“have” and “have-not” installations, depending solely on how MACOM 
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Figure 2.   Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) Funding5  
 
B. INSTALLATION ORGANIZATION 
1. Major Army Command (MACOM) Oversight 
Prior to October 2002, administration of Army installations was primarily a 
decentralized process (Figure 3).  Under the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), 
MACOMs were responsible for command and control of both their subordinate 
mission elements and the installations they were assigned to.  On each 
                                            
5 George Kopacki, “Your Base Support Resource Environment,” unpublished lecture slides 
from Garrison Pre-command Course curriculum (FY04), Army Management Staff College, Fort 
Belvoir, VA, slide 6. 
OPTEMPO – Operations Tempo   BOS – Base Operations Support 
OPRED – Operations Readiness  Enviro – Environment 
SRM – Sustainment, Readiness, and Modernization 
(Dollar amounts in figure are for illustrative purposes only.) 
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installation, garrison commanders provided base support to their tenant mission 
element units in accordance with their installation commander’s desires and the 
procedures and standards of their respective MACOMs, as disseminated by their 




Figure 3.   Installation Command Structure (before October 02)6 
 
2. Installation Management Agency (IMA) Oversight 
On October 1, 2002, the Army activated the Installation Management 
Agency (IMA), centralizing command and control of Army installations worldwide 
(Figure 4).  At that time, MACOMs were relieved of the responsibility of 
administering installations so they could focus more fully on training and 
deploying forces to fight wars and meet other contingency requirements.  
Garrison commanders now report to IMA headquarters through one of seven 
regional directors.  The IMA director reports to the Assistant Chief of Staff for 
                                            
6 Philip E. Sakowitz, “Army Transformation of Installation Management,” unpublished 
information briefing from the US Army Installation Management Agency, presented at the 
Garrison Pre-command Course, Army Management Staff College, Fort Belvoir, VA, November 
19, 2002, slide 34. 
G1 - Personnel 
G2 - Intelligence 
G3 - Operations 
G4 - Logistics 
G8 - Resource Management 
ACSIM  - Asst Chief of Staff for  
    Installation Management 
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Installation Management (ACSIM) who answers to the CSA.  General officer 
Senior Mission Commanders (known before as Installation Commanders) are 
now the second-line supervisors (senior-raters in Army parlance) of the garrison 
commanders.   
 
 
Figure 4.   Installation Command Structure (after Oct 02)7 
 
Another innovation of this new structure was the creation of a board of 
directors (BOD) composed of selected MACOM commanders and other key 
Army leaders.  This board establishes broad installation management policy and 
provides guidance on standard levels of support and resource allocation.  In this 
way, MACOM commanders are still involved to a degree in installation 
management business, but in a way that supports the efficiencies that come 
through standardization and centralized planning.  The IMA organization provides 
a corporate structure focused on installation management that 
                                            
7 Philip E. Sakowitz, “Army Transformation of Installation Management,” unpublished 
information briefing from the US Army Installation Management Agency, presented at the 
Garrison Pre-command Course, Army Management Staff College, Fort Belvoir, VA, November 
19, 2002, slide 14. 
G1 - Personnel 
G2 - Intelligence 
G3 - Operations 
G4 - Logistics 
G8 - Resource Management 
ACSIM  - Asst Chief of Staff for  
    Installation Management 
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• Supports mission commanders; 
• Controls migration of base support funds; 
• Achieves efficiencies; increases effectiveness; 
• Provides common standards; the means and methods to 
manage installations; 
• Leads Army Transformation.8 
With IMA, senior Army leadership hoped to be able to provide more 
resources to Army installations, return uniformed soldiers currently assigned to 
installation and garrison duties to combat units where they are needed, and 
standardize service delivery across installations to eliminate “have” and “have-
not” perceptions among soldiers, family members, and civilian staff. 
[Note to reader:  In October 2006, IMA underwent a reorganization that 
resulted in the creation of the U.S. Army Installation Management Command 
(IMCOM).  IMCOM completely replaced IMA and added two new subordinates: 
the Family and Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Command (FMWRC), and the 
Army Environmental Command (AEC).  The Assistant Chief of Staff for 
Installation Management (ACSIM) was “dual-hatted” as the Commanding 
General of IMCOM.  The former Director of IMA was designated Deputy 
Commanding General, IMCOM, and runs the day-to-day IMCOM headquarters 
command and control of Army installations, while the Commanding General 
spends a majority of his time functioning as ACSIM.    Additionally, in September 
2007, a revision of Army Regulation 10-87 removes the term Major Army 
Command and the acronym MACOM from the Army lexicon and designates each 
former MACOM as an Army Command (ACOM), an Army Service Component 
Command (ASCC), or a Direct Reporting Unit (DRU).9  IMCOM has been 
                                            
8 Ronald L. Johnson (Major General), “State of IMA,” unpublished briefing from US Army 
Installation Management Agency, presented at the Army Garrison Commanders Conference, Fort 
Bliss, TX, November 16, 2004, slide 4. 
9 Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units [Army 
Regulation 10-87], (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, September 4, 
2007), “Summary of Change” page; available on the Internet at http://www.army.mil/usapa/ 
epubs/pdf/r10_87.pdf (accessed on September 20, 2007). 
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designated as a DRU.  Throughout the remainder of this work, the acronym 
IMCOM will be used in place of IMA, except for references cited that have “IMA” 
in their original title.  The acronym MACOM will continue to be used throughout to 
refer to ACOMs, ASCCs, and DRUs as this change is not germane to the context 
herein, and many references cited have not yet been updated to reflect these 
recent changes in organization titles.] 
C. GARRISON OPERATIONS 
1. Standard Garrison Organization 
Garrison commanders are assisted in their installation management 
responsibilities by a functional staff of experts—military officers or non-
commissioned officers, civil servants, and contractors.  In essence, an installation 
commander is like the mayor of a city, the garrison commander is like a city 
manager, and the garrison staff is similar to the municipal staff working for a city 
manager or mayor.  The garrison staff supports the garrison commander and is 
responsible for administrating the six BASOPS areas previously mentioned.  The 
staff is organized according to the Standard Garrison Organization (SGO), 
prescribed by the IMA in May 2004 (Figure 5).  There are corresponding staff 
sections at the IMA regional and headquarters levels that provide technical 
support and oversight to the garrison staff.  Additionally, certain garrison staff 
sections have coordinating relationships with similar sections on the Senior 
Mission Commander’s staff (e.g., the garrison DPTMS with the mission element 
G3 [operations] or the garrison DOL with the mission element G4 [logistics].   
2. Installations as Flagships 
How the Army Runs, a U.S. Army War College publication, asserts, 
“Installations are the Army’s ‘face’ to the nation and the world.”10  Upon assuming 
his duties as Army Chief of Staff, General Peter J. Schoomaker made 
“Installations as Flagships” one of his 16 immediate focus areas.  In a February 
                                            
10 How the Army Runs, A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2003-2004, (Carlisle, PA: US 
Army War College, 2003), 381; available on the Internet at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/ 
dclm/linkedchapters.htm (accessed on December 14, 2004). 
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2004 press release about the focus areas, Army officials stated, “Installations 
must be resourced to be holistic communities and secure sanctuaries, but also 












Figure 5.   Standard Garrison Organization12 
 
In this effort, garrison commanders play an important public relations role 
with respect to the local municipalities where approximately two-thirds of the 
soldiers, and all of the civil servants and contractors working on the installation, 
live.  Not only are their significant economic benefits for municipalities located 
near Army installations, but installations are also becoming increasingly reliant on 
municipalities for support in their force protection programs.      
 
 
                                            
11 Marcia Triggs (Sergeant First Class), “Focus: Installations to serve as flagships,” Army 
News Service press release, February 3, 2004; available on the Internet at 
http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story_id_key=5635 (accessed on December 14, 2004).  
12 Ronald L. Johnson (Major General), “State of IMA,” slide 9.  
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III. ANTITERRORISM OR FORCE PROTECTION 
A. FORCE PROTECTION 
The definition of “force protection” as it relates to the military has evolved 
over the past decade since the 1996 Khobar Towers terrorist attack.  The second 
edition (1998) of Joint Pub 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 
Antiterrorism, provides the following definition of force protection: 
Security program designed to protect Service members, civilian 
employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all 
locations and situations, accomplished through planned and 
integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, 
operations security [OPSEC], personal protective services, and 
supported by intelligence,  counterintelligence, and other security 
programs.13  









Figure 6.   Force Protection Moving Van14 
 
                                            
13 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism [Joint Pub 3-07.2], 
(Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,  March 17, 1998), GL-3; available 
on the Internet at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_07_2.pdf (accessed on January 
20, 2005). 
14 David S. Burdick, “Introduction to Antiterrorism and Force Protection,” unpublished lecture 
slides from Garrison Pre-command Course curriculum (FY04), Army Management Staff College, 
Fort Belvoir, VA, slide 4. 
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In this definition, force protection might be viewed as a moving van that carries 
within it all of the other supporting programs administered by various staff 
sections within a military command (Figure 6).  The Combating Terrorism 
Program is further broken down into four sub-programs:  counterterrorism, 
antiterrorism, terrorism consequence management, and intelligence support.  
Since Khobar Towers, the Army has focused its force protection efforts primarily 
on antiterrorism, which is discussed further in the next section of this chapter.  
The attack on the USS Cole in October 2000, followed a year later by the 
9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon, caused senior 
military officials to rethink the definition of force protection, especially as it 
pertains to security of military forces “in transit,” as the USS Cole was when it 
was attacked.  The revised DoD definition of force protection reads:  
Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against 
Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), 
resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions 
conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the 
decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and 
synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the 
effective employment of the joint force while degrading 
opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include 
actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, 
or disease.15 
This definition is best depicted by the force protection umbrella (see Figure 7).  
Arrayed under the umbrella’s protection are the various coordinated and 
synchronized actions needed to protect DoD personnel, resources, facilities, and 
critical information.   
It is interesting to note that this definition suggests a looser view of force 
protection as a collection of separate actions that are coordinated, rather than a 
security program of its own that integrates subordinate programs into the whole.  
Another major difference is the new definition’s intent to “prevent and mitigate 
                                            
15 DoD Antiterrorism Handbook [DoD O-2000.12-H], (Washington, DC: Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, February 9, 2004), 
28; available on the SIPRNET from the Antiterrorism Enterprise Portal (ATEP) at 
http://www.atep.smil.mil (accessed on January 21, 2005). 
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hostile actions” instead of the old definition’s mandate to “protect…in all locations 
and situations.”  The new definition also excludes “accidents, weather, or 
disease” presumably because they are not considered hostile actions.  (This may 
be a bit short-sighted as the U.S. Intelligence Community would likely agree that 
a terrorist organization, or some other sympathetic nation, group, or individual 




Figure 7.   DoD Force Protection Umbrella16 
 
 
                                            
16 Rick Pressnell (Major), “Army Antiterrorism Program,” unpublished briefing from HQ, 
Department of the Army, G-3/5/7 (DAMO-ODL), presented at the Garrison Pre-command Course, 

















At the time of this writing, the Joint Staff (for the Joint Chiefs of Staff) are 
proposing yet another definition of force protection:   
All measures and means taken to minimize the vulnerability of DoD 
personnel, facilities, equipment, and operations to all hazards in 
order to preserve the operational effectiveness of the force.  Force 
protection is an inherent mission supported by diverse but 
complementary efforts including, at a minimum, antiterrorism, 
counterterrorism, CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear] 
Defense, DCIP [DoD Critical Infrastructure Program], IO 
[information operations], law enforcement operations, physical 
security, HRP [high-risk personnel], crisis and consequence 
management, force health protection, and intelligence support.17 
This proposed definition corrects the omission of the current definition by 
once again describing force protection as a concept including the spectrum of 
non- hostile activities such as a natural disasters and hazardous material 
(HAZMAT) response.  It also defines force protection in terms of a more concrete 






































































































































Figure 8.   Proposed Force Protection Architecture18 
                                            
17 “The Revised Force Protection Concept,” unpublished briefing slides from the Joint Staff, 
Deputy Directorate for Antiterrorism and Homeland Defense (DD AT/HD), received via e-mail 
from HQ, Department of the Army, G-3/5/7 (DAMO-ODF), April 7, 2005, slide 2.   
18 Ibid., slide 3.  
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B. ANTITERRORISM 
Reviewing the major terrorist attacks against the U.S. over the past twenty 
years reveals some interesting points about the evolution of the Army’s (and the 
entire Armed Forces‘) force protection and antiterrorism policy and procedures 
(Table 1).  In each of the events cited in the table, the attack that occurred was 
not from the perceived threat that military or law enforcement officials planned 
defenses against.  In every instance except for the 9/11 attacks, the destructive 
device was a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED).  Consequently, 
Army antiterrorism efforts have been properly directed toward deterring or 
preventing a terrorist attack from a VBIED.  However, as U.S. experience against 
insurgent forces in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown, this is not as easy as it 
would seem for the world’s lone superpower.    
Table 1.   Historical Perspective of Selected Terrorist Attacks19 
 
The 1998 version of AR 525-13, now titled Antiterrorism/Force Protection, 
introduced the AT/FP acronym as well as this definition of antiterrorism (AT):  
Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals 
and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and 
                                            
19 DoD Antiterrorism Handbook [DoD O-2000.12-H], 20. 
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containment by local military forces. The AT Program is one of 
several security-related programs that fall under the overarching 
Force Protection and Combating Terrorism programs. An AT 
Program is a collective effort that seeks to reduce the likelihood that 
Department of Defense affiliated personnel, their families, facilities, 
and materiel will be subject to a terrorist attack, and to prepare to 
respond to the consequences of such attacks should they occur.20 
This definition was carried over into the subsequent version of AR 525-13, 
renamed Antiterrorism—a way for the Army to continue to emphasize prevention 
and mitigation of hostile attacks on its installations and units and to try to 
eliminate the earlier confusion in terminology by de-linking antiterrorism and force 
protection.  
This current version of AR 525-13 (January 4, 2002), along with defining 
“antiterrorism,” organized commanders’ antiterrorism responsibilities into eight 
critical tasks: 
• Critical task 1:  Establish an Antiterrorism Program 
• Critical task 2: Collection, analysis, and dissemination of threat 
information 
• Critical task 3: Assess and reduce critical vulnerabilities (conduct 
AT assessments) 
• Critical task 4: Increase antiterrorism awareness in every soldier, 
civilian, and family member 
• Critical task 5: Maintain installation defenses in accordance with 
FPCON [force protection conditions] 
• Critical task 6:  Establish civil/military partnership for WMD crisis 
• Critical task 7:  Terrorist threat/incident response planning 
• Critical task 8:  Conduct exercises and evaluate/assess AT plans21  
                                            
20 Antiterrorism [Army Regulation 525-13], (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of 
the Army, January 4, 2002), 42; available on the Internet at https://akocomm.us.army.mil/usapa/ 
epubs/dr_pubs/dr_b/pdf/r525_13.pdf?feedAHP=Y (accessed on February 25, 2005).  
21 Ibid., 10-17. 
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In the sections that follow, each task will be discussed and related to 
similar functions performed in municipalities. 
1. Critical Task 1:  Antiterrorism Program 
Critical Task 1 of AR 525-13 states:  “Commanders will communicate the 
spirit and intent of all AT policies throughout the chain of command or line of 
authority by establishing AT Programs that provide standards, policies, and 
procedures to reduce the vulnerabilities from terrorist attacks.”22  As a lack of 
command emphasis and operational focus on AT was cited in the report from the 
FY2002 DAIG Army Antiterrorism Program Inspection as the most important root 
cause of AT program ineffectiveness, this critical task seeks to address this issue 
up front.  To further emphasize command involvement in installation AT 
programs, the Installation Management Command (IMCOM) published its AT 
Strategic Plan, “Protecting our Flagships of Readiness,” in July 2006.  This 
IMCOM AT Strategic Plan is patterned after the Department of the Army’s AT 
Strategic Plan, which complies with the DoD AT Strategy.  It provides the 
roadmap for all Army garrisons to follow as they develop their own AT plans and 
procedures.  The IMCOM AT Strategic Plan specifies measurable standards that 
are evaluated during Force Protection Assessment Team (FPAT) visits made 
periodically by the Department of the Army’s AT staff.  IMCOM is also developing 
its own assessment capability that will evaluate compliance of Army installations 
with the standards, policies, and procedures set forth in its AT strategic plan. 
The IMCOM AT strategy correlates somewhat with various state-level 
contingency plans, policies, and procedures that have been established since the 
9/11 attacks for responding to a terrorist incident at any given municipality.  
Similarly crafted response plans at the local municipality level correspond to 
installation-level AT plans developed by the garrisons.  Although the DoD, Army, 
and IMCOM strategies loosely devolve from the National Defense Strategy and 
National Military Strategy, they more closely align with the National Response 
                                            
22 Antiterrorism [Army Regulation 525-13], 11. 
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Plan and the National Strategy for Homeland Security, sharing this common 
origin with the state and municipal response plans. 
2. Critical Task 2:  Threat Information 
AR 525-13 directs that “Commanders at installation level and above will 
have a fully integrated foreign, domestic, and criminal intelligence AT intelligence 
program focused and based on priority intelligence requirements (PIR), that 
provides the appropriate threat information to protect personnel, family members, 
facilities, material, and information in all locations and situations.”23  Garrison 
Commanders are expected to have a system in place that enables them to 
collect, analyze, and disseminate terrorist threat information.  They are further 
expected to use threat information to recommend to their respective installation 
commanders what the appropriate force protection condition (FPCON) should be. 
Finding 11 of the Downing Commission Report on the Khobar Towers 
attack, stated that “the lack of an organic intelligence support capability in U.S. 
Air Force Security Police units adversely affects their ability to accomplish the 
base defense mission.”24  The report went on to indicate that “in contrast, U.S. 
Army Military Police battalions have an assigned intelligence section.”25  While 
this is true, the duties performed by these “intelligence sections” are focused on 
the functions of the MP Corps in support of combat and combat-like operations 
rather than installation base operations that garrison commanders are engaged 
in day-to-day.  This distinction is important to note because today, the Army finds 
itself in the same predicament as the Air Force was in at Khobar Towers over a 
decade ago—there is no organic intelligence support capability within an Army 
garrison organization capable of providing the kind of intelligence needed to 
combat the threats it expects to face in a post-9/11 world.   
                                            
23 Antiterrorism [Army Regulation 525-13], 12.  
24 Report to the President and Congress on the Protection of U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad, 
Annex A: The Downing Investigation Report, 54. 
25 Ibid.  
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At the national level, attempts have been made to rectify the problem of 
intelligence.  At its inaugural annual antiterrorism conference in 2000, the Army 
introduced the concept of “intelligence fusion” to address the intelligence 
shortfalls identified in the Downing Commission Report.  The Antiterrorism 
Operations and Intelligence Cell (ATOIC) was created that same year as a 
Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) element designed to fuse 
criminal information with tactical intelligence to form a single threat picture.  The 
missions of ATOIC are: 
• Provide strategic and tactical warning and maintain visibility of 
terrorist threats to the U.S. Army worldwide; 
• Analyze terrorist-related intelligence and review criminal information 
(fusion) [italics in original]; 
• Support antiterrorism and force protection through participation in 
assessment teams and policy review; 
• Monitor and report worldwide threat conditions.26 
ATOIC intelligence products are provided to the senior leadership of the 
Army to aid in their force protection decision making and are available to all Army 
commanders on their classified Internet web site.  A parallel effort emerged after 
the 9/11 attacks beginning with the formation of the Department of Homeland 
Security, and culminating with the creation of the Terrorist Threat Integration 
Center (TTIC), which has since become the National Counterterrorism Center 
(NCTC).   
Originally, “elements of the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI’s 





                                            
26 David S. Burdick, “Intelligence Fusion,” unpublished lecture slides from Garrison Pre-
command Course curriculum (FY04), Army Management Staff College, Fort Belvoir, VA, slide 7. 
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Center, and the Department of Defense [formed] a Terrorist Threat Integration 
Center to fuse and analyze all-source information related to terrorism.”27  Under 
its current guise,    
NCTC serves as the primary organization in the United States 
Government for integrating and analyzing all intelligence pertaining 
to terrorism possessed or acquired by the United States 
Government (except purely domestic terrorism); serves as the 
central and shared knowledge bank on terrorism information; 
provides all-source intelligence support to government-wide 
counterterrorism activities; establishes the information technology 
(IT) systems and architectures within the NCTC and between the 
NCTC and other agencies that enable access to, as well as 
integration, dissemination, and use of, terrorism information.28 
Like ATOIC, NCTC’s intelligence products are available on the Internet; however, 
the NCTC web site is unclassified and available to a wider public audience. 
Since AR 525-13 requires garrison commanders to have a fully integrated 
foreign, domestic, and criminal intelligence program, yet does not provide an 
organic intelligence capability to the garrison organization, how is this to be 
accomplished?  The ultimate solution is for the Army to authorize and fund an 
appropriate number of intelligence analyst positions within the garrison staff for 
every installation.  While IMCOM is pursuing this with HQDA, garrisons are 
encouraged to try to develop some sort of intelligence capability from within their 
own resources, as well as leverage capability from adjacent civilian 
municipalities.  This is accomplished through an ad hoc organization known as a 
“Threat Working Group,” or “Intelligence Fusion Cell.”  These groups are often 
chaired by the garrison’s antiterrorism officer and include representatives from 
the garrison provost marshal office, the supporting Criminal Investigation Division 
(CID) resident agency, the supporting military intelligence detachment, the 
garrison security office, the garrison directorate of logistics, and the garrison 
directorate of public works, as well as select municipal, state, and federal 
                                            
27 “Fact Sheet: Strengthening Intelligence to Better Protect America,” (Washington, DC:  The 
White House, January 28, 2003); available on the Internet at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2003/01/20030128-12.html (accessed on October 29, 2007). 
28 “What We Do,” National Counterterrorism Center web site home page; available on the 
Internet at http://www.nctc.gov/about_us/what_we_do.html (accessed on October 29, 2007). 
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agencies and organizations such as local police, local public works and utilities, 
state criminal investigation offices, and the FBI.  
The Intelligence Fusion Cell provides intelligence support to the garrison 
commander and provides a venue for the exchange of pertinent criminal and 
terrorist intelligence information among installation, municipal, state, and federal 
agencies and organizations.  Essentially, the fusion cell provides the garrison 
commander with a common operational picture of his/her areas of operations and 
interest, contributing to successful decision making with respect to FPCON, 
incident or event response, and the overall security and well-being of solders, 
family members, and civilian staff working and living on the installation.   
With respect to intelligence gathering and analysis, the capabilities of 
municipalities reside in their police departments and are limited primarily to 
criminal intelligence.  Like military installations, municipalities have seen the need 
for developing an intelligence fusion capability to provide the missing terrorist 
threat information.  Most municipalities participate in FBI-sponsored state or 
regional Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), where threat information from 
federal and state agencies is shared with municipal officials.  These efforts have 
met with some controversy, and all levels of government have been pressured to 
carefully weigh the needs of public security against the public’s reasonable 
expectation that government will guarantee individual privacy and civil liberties.  
The Patriot Act legislation has been the subject of much debate during the past 
few years with convincing arguments made in support of both sides.  Garrison 
commanders and staffs must also use caution in their intelligence operations, for 
reasons that pre-date the Patriot Act.  DoD Directive 5200.27, Acquisition of 
Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the 
Department of Defense, states: “DoD policy prohibits collecting, reporting, 
processing, or storing information on individuals or organizations not affiliated 
30 
with the Department of Defense,”29 unless the information is essential to the 
accomplishment of these specific DoD missions:   
• Protection of DoD functions and property  
• Personnel security of members of the Armed Forces, retirees, 
members of the Reserve Components, and DoD civilian personnel  
• Operations related to civil disturbance, but only when authorized by 
the Secretary of Defense to obtain essential information to meet 
operational requirements in response to “a distinct threat of a civil 
disturbance exceeding the law enforcement capabilities of State 
and local authorities30 
This directive further states that “where collection activities are authorized to 
meet an essential requirement for information, maximum reliance shall be placed 
upon domestic civilian investigative agencies, Federal, State, and local.”31 
Essentially, the DoD is not to be used to “spy” on U.S. citizens or others 
not affiliated with DoD, except where specifically authorized for particular DoD 
purposes.  Military Intelligence units are not authorized to gather the kind of 
domestic intelligence garrison commanders need to develop threat assessments 
and make FPCON recommendations.  In striving for a balance between 
protecting civil liberties and enabling the military to obtain the information it needs 
about threats against its installations, facilities, or personnel, garrison 
commanders must leverage the knowledge and capabilities of civilian 
investigative agencies such as the FBI, state bureaus of investigation, and local 
police departments to satisfy the intent of Critical Task 2.  This is successfully 
accomplished where garrisons have developed and nurtured good working 
relationships with these civilian agencies. 
                                            
29 Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the 
Department of Defense [DoD Directive 5200.27], (Washington, DC: Under Secretary of Defense 
for Policy, January 7, 1980), 2; available on the Internet at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/ 
directives/corres/pdf/520027_010780/520027p.pdf (accessed on February 23, 2007).  
30 Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the 
Department of Defense [DOD Directive 5200.27], 4. 
31 Ibid., 2.  
31 
3. Critical Task 3:  Critical Vulnerabilities 
Vulnerability assessments are used to determine the installation’s ability to 
protect personnel, information, and critical resources by detecting or deterring 
threat attacks.  If that is not possible, then these assessments may be used to 
protect the installation by delaying or defending against threat attacks.  Garrison 
commanders are required by AR 525-13 to conduct a self-assessment of their 
overall antiterrorism (AT) Programs within 60 days of assumption of command, 
and annually thereafter.  Garrison commanders are also required to conduct a 
comprehensive vulnerability self-assessment at least once every three years. 
This comprehensive self-assessment must include the following functional areas: 
• Physical security 
• Engineering 
• Operations, training, and exercises 
• Military intelligence 
• Criminal intelligence 
• Command and control 
• Law enforcement 
• Threat options 
• Operations security (OPSEC) 
• Medical 
• Executive protection, or protection of high risk personnel32 
These self-assessments are best conducted by use of an ad hoc team 
formed by the garrison commander and usually led by the antiterrorism officer.  
Members of the team would normally include structural and facilities engineers, 
physical security inspectors, law enforcement and access control personnel, 
medical experts, information and communications managers, intelligence and  
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security officers, and human and resource managers.  This team surveys the 
entire installation and organizes its findings in accordance with the functional 
areas previously listed. 
Installation vulnerabilities are also discovered and documented by external 
assessment teams.  After the Khobar Towers attacks, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
established the Joint Services Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) 
program to assist installations from all military services in identifying and 
mitigating vulnerabilities.  JSIVA teams are functionally oriented as depicted in 
Figure 9, and include a representative from the office of the Chairman, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to provide policy guidance and other assistance to the 














































Figure 9.   JSIVA Team Composition33  
 
                                            
33 Barry Cheyne, “Combat Support Assessments,” unpublished briefing from Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency (DTRA), presented at the Garrison Pre-command Course, Army Management 
Staff College, Fort Belvoir, VA, October 14, 2004, slide 9. 
33 
JSIVA teams spend five days at each installation they assess and provide 
an exit brief to the garrison commander and staff before they depart.  They also 
provide a classified written report of vulnerability assessment findings and 
observations to the garrison commander within 30 days of their visit. 
HQ, IMCOM also provides external assessments of its garrisons by 
means of the Higher Headquarters Assessment Team (HHAT) program.  HHAT 
teams are organized functionally, following the pattern of JSIVA teams and 
perform essentially the same functions.  Garrisons will typically receive either a 
JSIVA or an HHAT assessment once every three years.  Although both teams 
assess the same areas in the same manner, the JSIVA team only references 
DoD policy, instructions, and directives.  In contrast, HHAT teams augment DoD 
guidance with reference to HQDA policy, regulations, and doctrine, bringing their 
assessment “closer to home” for garrison commanders and their staffs. 
It is not enough to simply conduct a self-assessment, or receive an 
external assessment of installation vulnerabilities.  Garrison commanders must 
take the results of these assessments and work to mitigate the vulnerabilities 
identified.  HQDA has developed a web-based tool called CVAMP, the Core 
Vulnerability Assessment Management Program, to assist commanders with this, 
as well as enable these vulnerabilities to be more visible to senior leadership 
higher up in the chain of command. Most importantly, CVAMP provides an 
automated means for submitting and justifying funding requests, streamlining the 
process and providing a tracking mechanism for managing vulnerabilities from 
initial identification through mitigation, or perhaps elimination. 
Outside the military, the 2006 National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
(NIPP) provides policy guidance to federal, state, and local government entities, 
as well as to the private sector, which is responsible for much of the nation’s 
critical infrastructure.   
The NIPP provides the coordinated approach that will be used to 
establish national priorities, goals, and requirements for CI/KR 
[critical infrastructure/key resource] protection…to reduce 
vulnerability, deter threats, and minimize the consequences of 
34 
attacks and other incidents.  It establishes the overarching 
concepts relevant to all CI/KR sectors identified in HSPD-7 
[Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7], and addresses the 
physical, cyber, and human considerations required for effective 
implementation of comprehensive programs.  The plan specifies 
the key initiatives, milestones, and metrics required to achieve the 
Nation’s CI/KR protection mission.  It sets forth a comprehensive 
risk management framework and clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities for…Federal, State, local, tribal, and private sector 
security partners.34 
Army installations and their adjacent municipalities should ensure that 
their respective vulnerability assessments and risk management efforts are 
coordinated.  A nuclear power facility near an Army installation is a potential 
vulnerability to the installation as well as to the adjacent city and county.  
Likewise, freight rail lines running through an Army installation and the adjacent 
city and county would be a vulnerability to the entire area should a passing train 
load of hazardous materials somehow derail or suffer some type of attack that 
would cause toxic substances to be dispersed into the air or water system.   
4. Critical Task 4:  Antiterrorism Awareness 
In the immediate days, weeks, and months following the 9/11 attacks, U.S. 
citizens came together as a nation as they haven’t since the Pearl Harbor attack 
of December 7, 1941.  No sacrifice was too great as we looked for ways to help, 
and the president challenged us to continue to live our lives as normally as 
possible, albeit with extra vigilance.  America responded—its citizens rallied 
behind deploying troops and awareness of the dangers that al Qaeda and other 
terrorist groups pose became a part of everyday conversation.  School children 
rehearsed lock-down procedures and there was a run on duct tape and plastic at 
local building supply retailers.   
In this seventh year after the 9/11 attacks, America has become war 
weary and the lack of further attacks on American soil has allowed a spirit of 
complacency to set in, frustrating efforts to maintain a posture of antiterrorism 
                                            
34 National Infrastructure Protection Plan, (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, 2006), i; available on the Internet at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf 
(accessed on January 25, 2008). 
35 
awareness in daily life.  This attitude is prevalent across the nation, to include 
Army installations, challenging garrison commanders to “ensure that all 
personnel are aware of the terrorist threat and adequately trained in the 
application of protective measures.”35  Commanders accomplish this critical task 
by completing the following subordinate tasks: 
• Ensure antiterrorism training is an integral part of unit training 
plans, major training exercises/events, and a special interest item 
at training management reviews 
• Enhance the general awareness of terrorism issues (Command 
Information Program, public affairs office effort, etc.) 
• Assign antiterrorism officers… to provide training to unit members 
and advise the commander on antiterrorism matters  
• Ensure antiterrorism officers are formally trained and certified 
• Conduct annual antiterrorism awareness training 
• Provide senior level leadership with antiterrorism knowledge 
[facilitate their attendance at one of the inter-service executive level 
antiterrorism seminars conducted three times each year by the 
Joint Staff] 
• In significant and high threat areas, ensure personnel receive 
training concerning hostage survival36 
The Army awareness philosophy is to educate its population concerning 
the nature of the terrorist threat, and provide practical means to recognize 
terrorist surveillance, steps to take to avoid being targeted by terrorists, and 
protective actions to implement if an attack occurs.  In contrast to the Army 
philosophy, the Department of Homeland Security takes an all-hazards 
approach, sponsoring the “Ready” Internet site (http://www.ready.gov/), designed 
to help Americans prepare for any emergency, but emphasizing severe weather 
                                            
35 Antiterrorism [Army Regulation 525-13], 14. 
36 Antiterrorism [Army Regulation 525-13], 14. 
36 
and natural disaster events.  The approach is not focused as much on deterrence 
and prevention as the Army’s is, but rather stresses preparation for, and 
response to, an emergency event.  Both approaches are necessary and the 
challenge for garrison commanders and municipal leaders is to counter the 
climate of complacency with an aggressive awareness campaign that helps the 
entire population detect, deter, prepare for, and respond to any type of 
emergency situation. 
5. Critical Task 5:  Installation Defenses 
An inherent responsibility of any command in the military is the protection 
of one’s forces so that they can be employed to execute their assigned missions. 
Protection of an Army installation is the responsibility of the Senior Mission 
Commander, typically the senior general officer assigned to the installation.  The 
day-to-day execution of this responsibility belongs to the garrison commander 
who must “ensure that antiterrorism specific security procedural and physical 
measures are employed to protect personnel, information, and material 
resources from terrorist threats.”37 
One only needs to attempt to enter an Army installation to see that 
garrison commanders take this responsibility seriously.  Hundreds of millions of 
dollars have been invested in the ongoing development and improvement of a 
comprehensive access control program that includes a combination of contractor 
and DoD civilian security guards, military and DoD police officers, military 
working dog units, barriers, bollards, fences, lighting, surveillance cameras, 
vehicle searches, and identification checks.  This program provides a visible 
deterrent to any would-be attackers and provides a psychological feeling of 
comfort and security for those that live and work on Army installations, especially 
those family members who have fathers, mothers, and spouses deployed to 
combat theaters. 
Along with the access control program, garrison commanders are 
providing extra protection for locations and facilities within the installations that 
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have been designated as critical assets or high risk targets, to include areas of 
high population concentration.  Additionally, individuals designated as high risk 
personnel due to their rank or position, or the symbolic nature of their 
responsibilities, are provided protection beyond that provided to the general 
installation population.  Random antiterrorism measures are also implemented at 
access control points and other select locations on Army installations to thwart 
enemy surveillance attempts to detect patterns or routines in security procedures 
that could be exploited. 
Municipalities would have some difficulty with this task, as it is virtually 
impossible to completely control access into a city or town.  Specific high value or 
critical locations could be protected, traffic controlled or diverted, and surveillance 
cameras employed (although not without court challenges concerning violations 
of civil liberties), but nothing to the extent of that done on Army installations.  For 
this reason, municipalities focus more on response to an emergency event, 
rather than defense against one. 
6. Critical Task 6:  Civil/Military Partnership 
This critical task gets to the heart of the argument of this paper—the 
successful defense of Army installations against terrorist attacks, and response 
to them should they occur, requires close and enduring partnerships with 
adjacent municipalities.  There are four elements to this task as outlined in AR 
525-13: 
• Commanders will ensure antiterrorism plans are coordinated with 
local community officials to ensure a complete understanding of 
how and what military or civilian support will be rendered in the 
event of a WMD [weapons of mass destruction] crisis. 
• It is imperative that commanders attempt to establish Memoranda 
of Understandings (MOUs) and/or Memoranda of Agreements 
(MOAs) with the local authorities to foster relationships that 
facilitate the shared use of critical resources.  [Commanders and 
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civilian authorities will quickly discover that the effects of a 
catastrophic WMD event immediately overwhelm the capabilities of 
their organic assets.] 
• It is highly encouraged that commanders include local agencies, 
that is, police, FBI, fire and medical authorities in committee 
meetings and working groups to assist in the development and 
execution of antiterrorism plans. 
• Commanders will ensure that any support provided to civilian law 
enforcement agencies complies with AR 500–51 [ensuring that 
soldiers are not used in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act (18 
USC § 1385)].38 
As Figure 10 suggests, the ability of Army installations and adjacent 
municipalities to support one another in response to an emergency event varies 
according to the capabilities of each entity.  From the installation perspective, a 
small installation adjacent to a small town, each with minimal assets and 
capability to contribute, would be viewed as having “limited” capacity to respond 
to a crisis and would therefore need the assistance of regional, state, or federal 
assets.  A smaller installation with minimal assets and capability adjacent to a 
larger city with greater resources and capability would be viewed as “dependent” 
on that city to augment the installation as necessary during a crisis.  An 
installation and adjacent city with roughly the same level of resources and 
capability would be viewed as “mutually supporting” each other in responding to 
a crisis situation.  Finally, an installation with a large amount of assets and 
capability adjacent to a small town with minimal assets and capacity would be 
viewed as “self-sufficient,” unlikely to request assistance from the adjacent 
municipality during a crisis.  Depending on which situation installations find 
themselves in, garrison commanders and staffs develop, rehearse, and employ 
different tactics, techniques, and procedures in conjunction with their municipal 
partners to ensure an effective response to an emergency or crisis event. 
                                            




























































Figure 10.   Emergency Response Capacity39 
 
Since the 9/11 attacks, Army installations have met with varying levels of 
success in developing or enhancing effective working relationships with their 
municipal partners.  One way to break the ice might be to use the graph in the 
above figure as a means to chart their collective emergency response capacity 
based on an assessment of available resources, training, facilities, and overall 
readiness to respond to a crisis.  As either entity obtains additional resources, 
training, facilities, etc. that would affect their capacity, their place on the graph 
can be updated.  Likewise, if either entity loses resources, or if training, facilities, 
or overall readiness suffers, that change can be updated on the graph as well.  
This drill helps each partner recognize the circumstances where it may become 
necessary to call upon regional, state, or federal assistance to mitigate the 
adverse effects of a crisis event or other emergency situation.  Collaborative 
emergency response working groups are essential for facilitating communication 
and information exchange on a routine basis, before a crisis occurs.   
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One specific example of installations and municipalities that have been 
successful in developing and maintaining effective emergency response 
partnerships is found in the Tidewater area of Virginia, where three Army 
installations (Fort Monroe, Fort Eustis, and Fort Story), and the Installation 
Management Command’s Northeast Region headquarters, are members of the 
Hampton Roads Emergency Management Committee (HREMC, 
http://www.hremc.org/).  This committee, whose membership includes 
representatives from all military installations in the region along with 19 local 
municipal governments, public health, Red Cross, and regional, state, and 
private sector partners, promotes   
the inter-jurisdictional and inter-agency coordination of emergency 
management issues and foster emergency preparedness in the 
Hampton Roads area.  Its purpose is to provide a working group for 
the exchange of information, experience and technology among the 
Hampton Roads Emergency Management officials and individuals 
with responsibilities in emergency management in the Hampton 
Roads area.40 
While admittedly, the HREMC is focused mostly on hurricane 
preparedness and response, the fact that such an organization exists and meets 
regularly to discuss and coordinate emergency management issues suggests 
that the region, to include its Army installations, would be able to respond 
effectively to other emergencies, including a terrorist or other type of WMD 
attack. 
7. Critical Task 7:  Response Planning 
In our post 9/11 culture of constant threat awareness and increased 
emphasis on emergency preparedness, this critical task is shared by Army 
installations and local municipalities.  AR 525-13 directs commanders to “develop 
reactive plans that prescribe appropriate actions for reporting terrorist threat 
information, responding to threats/actual attacks, and reporting terrorist 
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incidents.”41  Municipalities are focused mostly on “responding to threats/actual 
attacks” as well as severe weather and natural disaster events.  Garrison 
commanders have also expanded on the regulatory mandate and plan response 
actions for severe weather and natural disasters as well. 
Terrorist threat and incident response planning must be “affordable, 
effective, and attainable; tie security measures together; and integrate security 
efforts by assigning responsibilities, establishing procedures, and ensuring 
subordinate plans complement each other.”42  As installations rely more and 
more on municipal first responders, it is incumbent on garrison commanders to 
ensure that their response plans are coordinated with appropriate municipal 
officials to include the integration of installation evacuation plans with those of 
their respective municipal, regional, and state plans.  Additionally, garrison 
commanders of installations within the continental U.S. (CONUS) are required to: 
• Notify the local FBI office concerning threat incidents occurring at 
Army installations, facilities, and activities; 
• Take appropriate action to prevent loss of life and/or mitigate 
property damage before the FBI response force arrives;  
• Take appropriate action…to resolve the incident [If the FBI declines 
jurisdiction]…, [coordinating] the military response with Criminal 
Investigation Command elements, [and] state and local law 
enforcement agencies, as appropriate.43 
Garrison commanders of installations outside the continental U.S. 
(OCONUS) have two slightly different requirements: 
• Where practicable, involve host nation security and law 
enforcement agencies in AT reactive planning and request 
employment of host nation police forces in response to threat 
attacks;                                             
41 Antiterrorism [Army Regulation 525-13], 16.   
42 Ibid.  
43 Antiterrorism [Army Regulation 525-13], 16. 
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• Coordinate reactions to incidents of a political nature with the U.S. 
Embassy and the host nation, subject to instructions issued by the 
combatant command CINC with geographical responsibility.44 
The newly published National Response Framework (NRF), replacing the 
National Response Plan (NRP), requires state, tribal, and local governments “to 
develop detailed, robust all hazards plans and hazard- or incident-specific 
annexes with supporting procedures and protocols to address their locally 
identified hazards and risks.”45  The NRF offers these key aspects of response 
planning: 
• Acceptability – meets requirements within costs and timeframes  
• Adequacy – complies with guidance, addresses critical tasks 
• Completeness – incorporates major actions, objectives, and tasks  
• Consistency & Standardization – fosters interoperability 
• Feasibility – accomplishes critical tasks with resources available 
• Flexibility – all hazards approach, decentralized decision making 
• Interoperability & Collaboration – integrates complementary plans46 
8. Critical Task 8:  Exercises 
The final critical task is perhaps the most important as it requires 
commanders to “put it all together” by conducting exercises to “validate the AT 
plan, identify weaknesses, synchronize the AT plan with other related crisis 
action/consequence management plans, and develop corrective actions.”47  
These exercises provide the means for garrison commanders to ensure that the 
requirements of the other seven critical tasks are accomplished, not just because 
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they are included in an antiterrorism plan, but because they have been tested 
and shown to be operationally effective in accomplishing the overall security 
objectives that commanders have established and that their staffs will execute 
when necessary.   
Unfortunately, exercises are easily neglected due to complacency, 
competing and shifting priorities, and budget, staffing, or time constraints.  A 
successful exercise program requires the personal involvement of the 
commander to ensure that its execution is a priority of the command.  Involved 
commanders insist that their exercises contain a means of evaluation and follow-
up so that lessons learned are not lost, but rather incorporated into revisions of 
their plans, updates in policies and procedures, or requests for additional 
resources or personnel when needed to more effectively accomplish the 
antiterrorism mission. 
The National Response Framework contains an exercise requirement for 
all levels of government.  Exercises are training opportunities that enhance a 
municipality’s ability to respond effectively to a crisis situation.          
Exercises provide opportunities to test plans and improve 
proficiency in a risk-free environment. Exercises assess and 
validate proficiency levels. They also clarify and familiarize 
personnel with roles and responsibilities.  Well-designed exercises 
improve interagency coordination and communications, highlight 
capability gaps, and identify opportunities for improvement.48 
Army garrisons and their adjacent municipalities must seize every 
opportunity to train and exercise together, developing the close working 
relationships that will be critical to executing a swift and effective response to 
terrorist attacks, major accidents, natural disasters, severe weather events, or 
any other emergency situation.  
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IV. HOMELAND DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY 
A. TERMS OF REFERENCE 
For many, the terms “Homeland Security” and “Homeland Defense” are 
used interchangeably to define the actions necessary to protect citizens of the 
United States from an enemy attack, specifically, in recent years, one 
promulgated by terrorists.  Within the federal government, and especially within 
the Departments of Defense (DoD) and Homeland Security (DHS), these terms 
are very distinct, and describe very specific plans, activities, and actions.  These 
terms also connote statutory and jurisdictional responsibilities for DoD and DHS. 
1. Homeland Security 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 reacquainted Americans with feelings of anger 
and revenge not felt since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.  Like the 
civil defense programs of the 1950s and 60s, designed to protect citizens against 
the nuclear threats of the Cold War, the 9/11 attacks have given rise to a new 
form of civil defense, that of Homeland Security, which is defined in the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist 
attacks within the United States [italics added], reduce America’s vulnerability to 
terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”49  
This focus on terrorism sets Homeland Security apart from Homeland Defense, 
as Homeland Security is a “shared responsibility built upon a foundation of 
partnerships [among] Federal, State, local, and Tribal governments, the private 
and non-profit sectors, communities, and individual citizens,”50 whereas 
Homeland Defense is a unique military mission with a broader scope of national 
defense responsibilities.   
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In its Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, DoD affirms: 
The primary mission of the Department of Homeland Security [is] to 
prevent terrorist attacks within the United States.  The Attorney 
General leads our Nation’s law enforcement effort to detect, 
prevent, and investigate terrorist activity within the United States. 
Accordingly, the Department of Defense does not have the 
assigned responsibility to stop terrorists from coming across our 
borders, to stop terrorists from coming through U.S. ports, or to 
stop terrorists from hijacking aircraft inside or outside the United 
States (these responsibilities belong to the Department of 
Homeland Security).  Nor does DoD have the authority to seek out 
and arrest terrorists in the United States (these responsibilities 
belong to the Department of Justice).51 
Dr. Karen Guttieri, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, notes:   
The U.S. military traditionally has been uncomfortable 
contemplating domestic operations.  For generations, American war 
fighters have met responsibility for national security through 
projection of power—taking the battle to the enemy.  The military in 
general stayed out of the domestic sphere, leaving police forces 
and federal civilian agencies such as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to keep 
order at home.52 
2.  Homeland Defense 
Like Homeland Security, Homeland Defense has taken on more 
significance during the past few years than it has at any other time since World 
War II.  Today, the military defines Homeland Defense as “[t]he protection of U.S. 
sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure 
against external [italics added] threats and aggression, or other threats as 
directed by the President.”53  From this it could be simplified that Homeland 
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Security deals with internal terrorist threats, while Homeland Defense deals with 
any external threats to national security.   However, DoD acknowledges an 
overlap in Homeland Defense and Homeland Security, noting the following: 
Threats planned or inspired by “external” actors may materialize 
internally.  The reference to “external threats” does not limit where 
or how attacks could be planned and executed.  The Department 
[of Defense] is prepared to conduct homeland defense missions 
whenever the President, exercising his constitutional authority as 
Commander in Chief, authorizes military actions.54 
Homeland Defense is not just concerned with defense against terrorist 
attacks, but rather defense against all threats directed at the U.S.  Homeland 
Defense is, in essence, the military response to attacks against the continental 
U.S., Alaska, Hawaii, or against any U.S. territory or possession, such as the 
U.S. response against Japan after the Pearl Harbor attack, or against 
Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks.  Some might even stretch this definition to 
include preemptive strikes against potential enemies, thereby labeling the current 
war in Iraq a Homeland Defense operation.  However, Homeland Defense does 
not fall under an Army installation’s “force protection umbrella” since force 
protection as currently defined, “does not include actions to defeat the enemy.”55   
3. Civil Support 
The military defines Civil Support as “Department of Defense support to 
U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies and for designated law 
enforcement and other activities.”56  Under the superseded Federal Response 
Plan, DoD provided Civil Support, known then as Military Support to Civil 
Authorities (MSCA), primarily in response to official requests from the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on behalf of states or localities 
suffering from severe disasters such as hurricanes, tornados, floods, extreme 
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winter weather, or forest fires.  Installation and garrison commanders also 
provided direct, immediate military support locally, but only to prevent death, 
extreme suffering, or severe property damage. 
The integration of FEMA into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
brought into question the definition of Homeland Security—does it include 
preventing or responding to severe disasters that are not the result of terrorism?     
The 2005 hurricanes (Katrina and Rita, among others) that devastated the U.S. 
Gulf Coast, and virtually destroyed a large portion of New Orleans, Louisiana, led 
to this belated recognition by the federal government: 
Certain non-terrorist events that reach catastrophic levels can have 
significant implications for homeland security.  The resulting 
national consequences and possible cascading effects from these 
events might present potential or perceived vulnerabilities that 
could be exploited, possibly eroding citizens’ confidence in our 
Nation’s government and ultimately increasing our vulnerability to 
attack.  [E]ffective preparation for catastrophic natural disasters and 
man-made disasters, while not homeland security per se, can 
nevertheless increase the security of the Homeland [italics in 
original].57 
Under the recently adopted National Response Framework, DoD 
continues to provide Civil Support to states and localities in the form of direct, 
immediate response to local officials to prevent death, extreme suffering, or 
severe property damage, or in deliberate response to FEMA requests 
coordinated with NORTHCOM.  Now known by its new acronym, DSCA (Defense 
Support of Civilian Authorities), most of the DoD support to Homeland Security 
since the 9/11 attacks has been Civil Support for domestic emergencies. 
4. Emergency Preparedness 
In the context of Homeland Security, Homeland Defense, and Civil 
Support, DoD defines Emergency Preparedness as “measures taken in advance 
of an emergency to reduce the loss of life and property and to protect a nation’s 
institutions from all types of hazards through a comprehensive emergency 
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management program of preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery.”58  
Emergency Preparedness within DoD includes planning for and implementing 
robust redundancy systems to ensure continuity of operations (COOP) 
throughout an emergency event, as well as DoD’s participation in national-level 
continuity of government (COG) planning to ensure that essential functions of 
government are sustained during a major attack or catastrophic crisis.  
Successful Emergency Preparedness within DoD “is defined as development and 
maintenance, in cooperation with the heads of other departments and agencies, 
of national security emergency plans, programs, and mechanisms that ensure 
effective mutual support between and among the military, civil government, and 
the private sector.”59   
B. U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND (USNORTHCOM) 
While state and local governments have made great progress in 
advancing homeland security initiatives since the 9/11 attacks, the military has 
struggled somewhat in trying to achieve balance between its traditional war 
fighting role, ongoing peacekeeping and nation-building endeavors, and its 
relatively new homeland security support responsibilities.  In October 2002, the 
Department of Defense established USNORTHCOM, a combatant command 
covering all of North America that “provide[s] command and control of 
Department of Defense (DoD) homeland defense efforts and coordinate[s] 
defense support of civil authorities.”60     
USNORTHCOM’s AOR [area of responsibility] includes air, land 
and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United 
States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding water out to 
approximately 500 nautical miles.  It also includes the Gulf of 
Mexico and the Straits of Florida.  The defense of Hawaii and [U.S.] 
territories and possessions in the Pacific is the responsibility of U.S. 
Pacific Command.  The defense of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 
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Islands is the responsibility of U.S. Southern Command. The 
commander of USNORTHCOM is responsible for theater security 
cooperation with Canada and Mexico.61  
(As U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Southern Command cover relatively few 
Army installations, this paper will confine itself to discussing the USNORTHCOM 
perspective on Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, and Civil Support, 
recognizing that similar challenges exist with respect to these missions within the 
other two commands.) 
The establishment of USNORTHCOM is unique in that it is the first time in 
U.S. history that a single command exists with command and control 
responsibilities over all military forces within the continental United States.  
Placing this much military power in the hands of a single commander was not 
without its critics.  Just as the nation’s founders were fearful of a large standing 
army after the Revolutionary War concluded, many modern politicians, pundits, 
and citizens at large questioned the need for this new command, and wondered 
aloud whether it would become just another layer of bureaucracy in the already 
too bureaucratic military-industrial complex President Eisenhower cautioned 
against.  To answer critics and mitigate some of their concerns, USNORTHCOM 
was established primarily as a planning and coordinating organization without 
permanently assigned subordinate combat or tactical units.  Instead, 
USNORTHCOM consists of a headquarters with subordinate joint force task 
forces, headquarters, and service component elements that are also free of 
permanently assigned subordinate units (Figure 11).   
USNORTHCOM plans, organizes and executes homeland defense 
and civil support missions, but has few permanently assigned 
forces. The command is assigned forces whenever necessary to 
execute missions, as ordered by the president and secretary of 
defense.62 
                                            




Figure 11.   USNORTHCOM Organization63 
 
Another reason for this lack of permanently assigned combat or tactical 
forces is political in nature in that the forces NORTHCOM would likely have 
assigned to it under a presidential directive would come primarily from 
federalized National Guard units—a move that is upsetting to some of the 
governors of the 54 states, territories, and the District of Columbia, who have 
seen their National Guard units federalized and deployed multiple times to Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and other international venues in support of GWOT and other 
missions of U.S. national interest since the 9/11 attacks.  Many governors would 
rather retain control of their National Guard units during a Homeland Security 
crisis, than see them federalized and placed under the command and control of 
USNORTHCOM.  USNORTHCOM coordinates closely with the National Guard 
Bureau, a DoD element that articulates and advocates National Guard matters at 
DoD level on behalf of the states, territories, and the District of Columbia.  
USNORTHCOM also coordinates closely with the U.S. Coast Guard, now part of 
DHS, on maritime and port security matters.  
As previously mentioned, one of USNORTHCOM’s missions is Homeland 
Defense.  It is focused on external threats to the nation itself, or threats from the 
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air, land, or sea approaches.  As Army installations are not combat organizations 
themselves, their garrison commanders are not involved directly in Homeland 
defense, except to support those combat units on their installations that would 
deploy for such missions.   
The second USNORTHCOM mission is Civil Support, a mission that the 
military performs admirably as noted during past events such as the perennial 
forest fires in the Western U.S., the Columbia space shuttle disaster in February 
2003, and the Hurricane Katrina response in the fall of 2005.  
USNORTHCOM’s civil support mission includes domestic disaster 
relief operations that occur during fires, hurricanes, floods and 
earthquakes.  Support also includes counter-drug operations and 
managing the consequences of a terrorist event employing a 
weapon of mass destruction.  The command provides assistance to 
a Lead Agency when tasked by DoD.  Per the Posse Comitatus 
Act, military forces can provide civil support, but cannot become 
directly involved in law enforcement.64 
Figure 12 shows the relationship among Homeland Security, Homeland 
Defense, Civil Support, and Emergency Preparedness as seen from the DoD 
perspective.  Within its area of operations USNORTHCOM is involved with each 
of the numbered missions, except for number 3, Airport Security, which falls 
completely within the realm of Homeland Security and is executed by the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA).  Another interesting observation 
concerning this paradigm is that there is no overlap between the Homeland 
Defense and Civil Support missions, although each of them overlaps Homeland 
Security.  For policy-making, statutory, budgeting, and training reasons, DoD and 
USNORTHCOM try very hard to keep these two missions completely separate, 




                                            











Figure 12.   DoD Homeland Security Paradigm65 
 
A final observation is that in keeping with the pure, terrorism-based 
definition of Homeland Security, as found in the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, DoD places support for natural disaster relief completely within the Civil 
Support mission circle, whereas CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 
Nuclear, and High Explosives) Consequence Management falls in the overlap 
area between Civil Support and Homeland Security since a CBRNE attack would 
likely be terrorist related.  
C. FORCE PROTECTION AND HOMELAND SECURITY 
In reviewing USNORTHCOM’s missions, one notes that Homeland 
Defense and Civil Support are focused outward—military elements providing 
overarching support directly to citizens at large (e.g., ballistic missile defense of 
North America), or targeted support to specific citizens, usually through another 
agency (e.g., response to natural disasters through FEMA or maritime security 
through the Coast Guard).  To the average citizen, the assumption is that “when 
they (the military) are needed, they are there.”  What is often overlooked, 
                                            
65 DoD Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept, 6. 
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especially prior to the 9/11 attacks, is how military crisis response capability is 
affected when attacks, disasters, or other crises occur on those installations 
municipalities expect to call on to respond to their own crises.  The downsizing of 
the military after the first Gulf War, coupled with an increase in terrorist attacks 
directed against military targets (e.g., Khobar Towers, the USS Cole, and the 
Pentagon), revealed weaknesses and vulnerabilities in military force protection 
programs that had been previously neglected by commanders at all levels.  Like 
the carefree adolescent believing he will live forever regardless of whether he 
exercises or eats right, only to grow up to become the overweight and out of 
shape, middle-aged adult, facing the reality of his inevitable mortality, the Army 
learned some lessons from these events and commanders quickly elevated force 
protection to “mission one.” 
Force protection is an essential element of homeland security.  Before 
military commanders can successfully execute homeland defense or civil support 
missions in support of homeland security, they must ensure that force protection 
has been addressed.  Garrison commanders are charged with managing Army 
installations—the Army’s home—providing safety, security, quality of life, training 
support, and a capability to deploy forces anywhere in the world.  Unfortunately, 
a garrison’s capacity to respond to an attack, severe weather event, natural 
disaster, or major accident on an Army installation, is limited due to modern 
budget realities and the high operations tempo of an Army at war.  Although 
garrisons are significantly engaged in force protection and antiterrorism activities, 
there is no existing doctrine describing how military installations obtain and 
integrate support from municipalities during times of crisis.  Installations have 
been left to themselves to identify and obtain necessary municipal support by 
means of memorandums of agreement (MOAs) or memorandums of 
understanding (MOUs).  The good news is that since the 9/11 attacks, 
installations and municipalities have cooperated more closely with one another to 
develop and synchronize emergency response operations.   
55 
D. NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (NIMS) 
On February 28, 2003, President George W. Bush issued Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), Management of Domestic Incidents.  
This directive outlined the president’s vision “to manage domestic incidents by 
establishing a single, comprehensive national incident management system.”66  
In December 2005, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) tasked 
IMCOM and other major commands to: 
provide a plan of action which will adopt and implement procedures 
consistent with the NIMS and the Incident Command System (ICS) 
for Army Installations…which have firefighting and military or DoD 
police capabilities.  The goal is to ensure all installations…are 
functionally aligned to provide or receive emergency response 
support from state and local first responders.67 
This section provides additional explanation about NIMS, and outlines the 
structure and functions of the Incident Command System (ICS).  This is followed 
by a discussion of the Installation Operations Center (IOC) and the functional 
alignment of its emergency response support responsibilities under NIMS. 
1. Defining NIMS  
NIMS is defined in HSPD-5 as a system providing “a consistent 
nationwide approach for Federal, State, and local governments to work 
effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from 
domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity.”68  NIMS includes “a 
core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies covering the 
Incident Command System (ICS); multi-agency coordination systems; unified 
command; training; identification and management of resources; qualifications 
and certification; and the collection, tracking, and reporting of incident information 
                                            
66 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), Management of Domestic Incidents, 
February 28, 2003, paragraph (1); available on the Internet at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html (accessed on March 13, 2008). 
67 Headquarters, Department of the Army Execution Order (HQDA EXORD) 693-05, Plan of 
Action for Implementation of the National Response Plan and National Incident Management 
System, 170003Z Dec 05, paragraph 3B. 
68 HSPD-5, paragraph (15). 
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and incident resources.”69  The comprehensive nature of NIMS is intended to 
provide for interoperability and compatibility among Federal, State, and local 
incident response capabilities. 
NIMS contains seven components that provide the national framework for 
preparing for, preventing, responding to, and recovering from domestic incidents, 
regardless of cause, size, or complexity.70  These components are command 
and management, preparedness, resource management, communications and 
information management, supporting technologies, and ongoing management 
and maintenance.  A thorough reading of the DHS NIMS publication will provide 
ample clarity of each of these components; however, a lesson learned from the 
Arlington County [VA] After-Action Report on the Response to the September 11 
Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon requires further discussion of an element of the 
command and management component—the Incident Command System.  
2. The Incident Command System (ICS) 
The NIMS command and management component comprises three key 
systems:  the Incident Command System, Multi-agency Coordination Systems, 
and Public Information Systems.  The ICS is of particular interest to garrisons as 
it is little understood outside the firefighting and law enforcement communities 
that originally developed and refined it over the past 30 years.  During the 
response to the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon, Arlington County emergency 
management team members soon realized that the Emergency Operations 
Center (EOC) management structure defined by the county’s Emergency 
Management Plan did not align with the ICS structure established by the 
Arlington County Fire Department at the incident scene itself.71  First responders 
at the Pentagon did not have stove-piped counterparts at the county’s EOC to 
                                            
69 HSPD-5, paragraph (15). 
70 National Incident Management System [NIMS], (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, March 1, 2004), 3; available on the Internet at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/ 
assets/NIMS-90-web.pdf (accessed on March 13, 2008).  
71 Arlington County [VA] After-Action Report on the Response to the September 11 Terrorist 
Attack on the Pentagon, D-8; available on the Internet at http://www.arlingtonva.us/departments/ 
Fire/edu/about/docs/after_report.pdf (accessed March 24, 2008). 
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reach back to for additional support and coordination.  This challenge was quickly 
overcome and did not hinder the overall success of the operation, but it was 
experiences like this that led to the creation of NIMS with its flexible and 
adaptable ICS that can be used across a broad spectrum of contingencies and 
by all levels of government and private sector response. 
The ICS provides a modular organizational structure that can be tailored 
for any incident. 
The incident command structural organization builds from the top 
down; responsibility and performance begin with the incident 
command element and the IC [incident commander].  When the 
need arises, four separate sections can be used to organize the 
staff.  Each of these may have several subordinate units, or 
branches, depending on the management requirements of the 
incident.  If one individual can simultaneously manage all major 
functional areas, no further organization is required.  If one or more 
of the functions requires independent management, an individual is 
assigned responsibility for that function.72 
Figure 13 shows the ICS structure in its most basic form.  In keeping with 
the NIMS principle of using a common terminology, each box represents a 
“section” that performs specific functions.  Each section may be further sub-
divided depending on the scope and complexity of the incident. 
 
Figure 13.   Basic ICS Structure73 
                                            
72 National Incident Management System [NIMS], 68. 
73 Ibid.  
Command
Logistics Planning Finance/Admin Operations 
58 
Functions of the Command Section are performed by the Incident 
Commander (IC) who is responsible for the overall management of an incident.  
The IC also approves any Incident Action Plans (IAP) developed and ensures 
their proper execution.  Within the Command Section, the functions of Public 
Information, Safety, and Liaison are also performed by appointees directly 
answerable to the IC.   
Public Information consists of that information that the IC disseminates to 
the pubic concerning the incident—not only the “five Ws” that the media wants 
answered, but more importantly, potentially life saving information such as what 
facilities/locations need to be evacuated, what evacuees should do, the condition 
of traffic flow in, out, and around the incident scene, and where citizens can go 
for assistance and further information.  The Safety Officer ensures that all first 
responders and other visitors to the incident scene are properly protected from 
harm by following appropriate safety procedures, wearing proper protective 
equipment, and keeping the scene clear of extraneous personnel and equipment.  
The Liaison function is performed by representatives from organizations/ 
agencies external to the IC’s parent organization.  The Liaison Officers are used 
to effectively coordinate response and recovery operations among responders 
from multiple jurisdictions and levels of government with the IC.        
The Operations Section is concerned with the direct response to the 
incident.  The Operations Section Chief manages all tactical activities at the 
scene under the direction of the IC.  The Operations Section may be broken 
down into branches that are usually functional in nature (e.g., fire suppression, 
rescue, triage, and recovery).  Branches may be further sub-divided into divisions 
(covering a specific geographic area) or groups (covering a specific functional 
assignment).  The span of control is typically 1:5, so the section would have no 
more than five subordinate branches, and each branch would have no more than 
5 divisions/groups to supervise. 
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The Planning Section is responsible for collecting, evaluating, and 
disseminating tactical information pertaining to the incident.  This 
section maintains information and intelligence on the current and 
forecasted situation, as well as the status of resources assigned to 
the incident.74   
The Planning Section may be further divided into the following units, 
depending on need:  Resources, Situation, Documentation, Demobilization, and 
Technical Specialist(s).  These units assist the Planning Section Chief in 
gathering and analyzing all data regarding incident operations and assigned 
resources, developing alternatives for tactical operations, conducting planning 
meetings, and preparing incident action plans (IAP) for each operational period 
(shift). 
The Logistics Section is responsible for all incident support requirements, 
to include “ordering resources through appropriate procurement authorities.  It 
also provides facilities, transportation, supplies, equipment maintenance and 
fueling, food service, communications, and medical services for incident 
personnel.”75  The Logistics Section may be subdivided into six units:  Supply, 
Ground Support, Facilities, Food, Communications, and Medical.  These units 
may also be assigned to subordinate branches of the Logistics Section (e.g., 
Communications, Medical, and Food in a Service Branch, and Supply, Facilities, 
and Ground Support in a Support Branch). 
A Finance/Administration Section is established by the IC when there is a 
specific need for financial reimbursement or administrative services to support 
incident management activities.  This section monitors the sourcing and 
expenditure of funds in response to the incident and forecasts the need for 
additional funds.  It also ensures that any statutory rules associated with certain 
funding are met. The Finance/Admin Section Chief may establish these 
functional units as needed:  Compensation/Claims, Procurement, Cost, and 
Time.  
                                            
74 National Incident Management System [NIMS], 77. 
75 Ibid., 82. 
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3. The Installation Operations Center (IOC) 
Unlike the ICS, which is an organization of functional areas used primarily 
by first responders at the scene of a crisis event, the Installation Operations 
Center (IOC) refers to the facility and organizational structure on an Army 
installation dedicated to the installation’s response to a contingency event.  The 
term contingency rather than crisis is significant as the IOC is used not only for 
crises, but for other significant installation events (e.g., terrorist attack, severe 
weather, natural disaster, mobilization and deployment, redeployment, or any 
other catastrophe or special event).  The IOC is a garrison component that: 
• Provides support to the IC at the scene of a contingency event; 
• Orchestrates the execution of “collateral activities” relative to the 
contingency event (e.g., traffic control, personnel evacuation, public 
information, or long-term logistical support to first responders); 
• Conducts consequence management operations to restore the 
installation to normal operations following crisis response or 
execution of a special event. 
The IOC is staffed by key directorates within the IMCOM Standard 
Garrison Organization (SGO), augmented by liaison officers (LNOs) and other 
action officers from both on- and off-post organizations and agencies.  The IOC 
may sometimes be co-located or absorbed within the senior mission element’s 
operations center.  Many garrisons with “stand-alone” IOCs have chosen to 
organize them using the five ICS functions.  Figure 14 shows how the 
directorates and offices within the IMCOM Standard Garrison Organization 
(SGO, Figure 15) might be arrayed under the standard ICS structure.  In keeping 
with the modular design of the ICS, one, some, or all of its sections may be 
organized and present at or near an incident scene on an Army installation.  
However, for most incidents likely to occur on installations it is assumed that only 
the command and operations sections/functions would be present at the actual 
incident scene, and that the other ICS functions of planning, logistics, and 
finance/administration would be performed within the IOC.      
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Figure 15.   Standard Garrison Organization76 
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The listing of SGO directorates under specific ICS sections is not 
absolute, but is done to show who would be engaged in doing the primary work 
of a particular ICS section/function.  Notice that some SGO items are listed under 
more than one ICS function as they might perform either or both of those 
functions at some point during crisis response or consequence management.  
Also note that the garrison commander (GC), deputy to the garrison commander 
(DCG), and the garrison command sergeant major (CSM) are not shown within 
the Command section or in any other ICS section.  This is intentional as the GC 
(assisted by the DCG and CSM) is responsible for the entire spectrum of garrison 
operations—all activities taking place at the scene of the incident (command and 
operations), those activities within the ICS (planning, logistics, and 
finance/admin), and all other ongoing garrison activities occurring anywhere else 
on the installation, much as a city mayor or city manager is responsible for all 
operations occurring within the city, even during response to an emergency 
situation or special event.  Organizing the SGO under the ICS structure helps 
facilitate effective communications and information exchange among garrison 
staff sections that supports the first response efforts of the operations section 
and keeps the garrison commander situationally aware.  This also contributes to 
flexible and timely decision making with respect to both crisis response and 
consequence management efforts.   
Figure 16 takes a different approach, depicting an organizational and 
functional lay-out of a typical IOC designed to support current operations (i.e., 
support to the IC at the scene of a contingency event and the execution of 
“collateral activities”), and future operations (i.e., consequence management).  
Current Operations is led by the “Battle Captain,” usually the DPTMS, or the 
Current Ops Officer within the DPTMS.  Future Operations is led by the Deputy 
to the Garrison Commander (DGC).  The GC does not have a “seat” in this IOC, 
which is intentional as it is not expected, nor desired, that the GC “run” the IOC.  




established joint operations or joint information center, and the mission element 
as necessary to maintain situational awareness and be available to provide 
information to the media, to victims/evacuees, and to the chain of command.  
 

























































Figure 16.   Typical IOC Organizational/Functional Lay-out  
 
The overlapping current and future operations ovals indicate that there 
must be interaction and direct coordination between the DPTMS and the DGC.  
Also, some staff may find themselves working within both spheres, particularly 
those sitting in the center row:  the Directorate of Logistics (DOL), the Directorate 
of Public Works (DPW), the Directorate of Resource Management (DRM), and 
the Directorate of Information Management (DOIM). 
Several factors are considered when deciding how to organize and 
employ the IOC, and how to apply NIMS and ICS within it.  The first 
consideration is historical effectiveness—has the IOC currently in place been 
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effective during past emergency operations?  The next consideration is the 
garrison commander him- or herself—what organization best fits his/her 
command style, method of receiving and processing information, and decision-
making methodology?  A third consideration is local conditions or situation—what 
kinds of support or facilities are available from the mission element or from the 
municipal government?  Will the installation face certain types of incidents (e.g., 
severe weather) more than others?  A final consideration (although there may 
still be others) is resources—what funds and time are available to purchase 
equipment, hire and train personnel, and construct or renovate facilities?   
While garrison commanders ponder these questions and work to achieve 
their ideal IOC structure and staffing in accordance with NIMS and ICS, the IOC 
will be employed as it currently exists to address the next crisis event, regardless 
of its size or scope.  Garrison Commanders must strive, with the resources they 
have, to identify and train their IOC personnel in emergency response 
operations, to include NIMS and ICS, so that when they are needed, they will be 
ready—to support an incident occurring on one of their installations, with or 
without first response assistance from their respective municipal partners, or to 
provide civil support to those municipal partners when requested or when 




V. CARLISLE BARRACKS CASE STUDY  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Carlisle Barracks is a small active-Army installation located in south 
central Pennsylvania approximately 20 miles west of Harrisburg, and 30 miles 
north of Gettysburg.  It is the home of the U.S. Army War College, chartered to 
prepare senior officers and civil servants for strategic level leadership positions 
throughout the Department of Defense. 
Like most military installations in September 2001, the garrison 
commander and staff at Carlisle Barracks had difficulty implementing the 
unprecedented, DoD-directed, world-wide upgrade to Force Protection Condition 
(FPCON) Delta, issued immediately after the 9/11 attacks occurred.  This 
directive mandated a full lock-down of all DoD installations and facilities, 
requiring increased manpower to seal off all access control points, as well as the 
establishment of round-the-clock emergency operations centers to track 
incoming intelligence reports and coordinate the implementation of additional 
measures to both protect the force and prepare for anticipated combat 
operations.  In the case of Carlisle Barracks, staff shortages led to the garrison 
commander recruiting some of the war college students (lieutenant colonels and 
colonels) to assist in staffing the emergency operations center during the days 
following the 9/11 attacks, until the FPCON Delta measures were relaxed.  
This case study will trace the evolution of force protection training at 
Carlisle Barracks since the 9/11 attacks and show how the Army Management 
Staff College has been instrumental in helping Carlisle Barracks improve its 
ability to shift from a focus on antiterrorism to the broader all-hazards approach 
of an integrated force protection/homeland security program.  This experience is 
typical of what most Army installations have gone through during the past seven 
years.  
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B. OPERATIONS GROUP ECHO 
The Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, trains brigade 
and battalion combat commanders in the art of war (particularly at the tactical 
and operational levels) through its Battle Command Training Program (BCTP).  
BCTP provides tailored seminars, computer-simulated decision-making 
exercises, and robust after-action reviews (AARs) that stimulate these 
commanders and their staffs to solve tactical problems, apply the Army's doctrine 
to challenging tactical situations, and promote a better overall appreciation of 
battle command and the complexities of war.   
In the days immediately following the 9/11 attacks, General John Abrams, 
Commanding General of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC), conducted an inspection tour of the 15 installations under his 
command to see how well they had accomplished the DoD-directed increase to 
FPCON Delta.  This tour culminated in a two-day conference hosted by General 
Abrams at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where the garrison commanders and 
select staff from each of the 15 TRADOC installations were invited to attend and 
share their successes and challenges in responding to the events of 9/11.  
During his tour, General Abrams found garrison commanders and their staffs to 
be “actively engaged, mission focused, and working hard to do the right thing,”77 
but there was no consistency in the way any of these installations approached 
their AT/FP responsibilities.   
Concluding that this lack of consistency was attributable to a lack of 
uniform training, clear doctrine, and a dedicated flow of resources, General 
Abrams directed the BCTP staff to organize Operations Group Echo.  This ad 
hoc group of military and civilian experts was tasked with adapting the BCTP 
model to Army installations, focusing particularly on terrorism.  During the six 
months immediately following the 9/11 attacks, Ops Group Echo traveled 
throughout the U.S. conducting crisis decision-making seminars and table-top 
crisis response exercises, assessing the capabilities of each of the 15 TRADOC 
                                            
77 Robert A. Cline (Colonel), Operations Group Echo Final AAR, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 
Battle Command Training Program, US Army Combined Arms Center, April 2002), 4.  
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installations to respond to a terrorist attack.  As one of these TRADOC 
installations, Carlisle Barracks hosted a visit from Ops Group Echo in the fall of 
2001 for their seminar, and again in March 2002 for their exercise.       
The Ops Group Echo reports confirmed for General Abrams that although 
the TRADOC installations (including Carlisle Barracks) ultimately succeeded in 
implementing the DoD-directed FPCON Delta measures, they were woefully 
unprepared to respond effectively to a catastrophic attack similar to the one on 
9/11 against the Pentagon.  Specifically, Carlisle Barracks realized that the small 
troop clinic on post would not be adequate to treat victims of a mass casualty 
event; its crisis response team and emergency operations center were not robust 
enough to handle the demands of a large-scale crisis event; and the lack of 
AT/FP doctrine caused gaps in intelligence gathering and analysis, as well as in 
overall decision making within the emergency operations center.   
In its final after action report, the commander of Ops Group Echo noted 
the following macro issues discovered during its six-month training and 
assessment period: 
• A lack of regional efforts across the [military] services to support 
each other with intelligence, public affairs, first responder, and other 
resources; 
• Training of our civilian staff members to execute the military 
decision-making process and evaluate chemical weapon 
employment is uneven; 
• Our ability to share information to generate a common operating 
picture is diminished by numerous terminology conflicts between 
the civilian emergency management protocols and those we use in 
the military, and by conflicts in our own doctrine.78 
                                            
78 Robert A. Cline (Colonel), Operations Group Echo Final AAR, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 
Battle Command Training Program, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, April 2002), Executive 
Summary.  
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Recognizing that these shortcomings were not unique to TRADOC installations, 
General Abrams used the findings from Ops Group Echo to launch a similar 
training program for all Army installations.  As Ops Group Echo continued its 
seminar and exercise visits to the TRADOC installations, General Abrams had 
already enlisted the help of the Army Management Staff College, directing them 
to design, develop, and deliver a BCTP-type AT/FP experience for all Army 
installations.    
C. COMMAND PROGRAMS  
1. History 
The Army Management Staff College (AMSC) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia is 
responsible to “educate and prepare Army civilian and military leaders to assume 
leadership and management responsibilities throughout the [Army] in order to 
support the Soldier on the ground.”79  Command Programs, one of AMSC’s two 
academic departments, is charged with preparing military and select civilian 
leaders for installation management responsibilities at any of the Installation 
Management Command’s garrisons world-wide, and at special Army garrisons 
belonging to other Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, or 
Direct Reporting Units.   
Command Programs offers courses for three key leaders on Army 
installations: the garrison commander (Garrison Pre-command Course), the 
garrison command sergeant major (Garrison Command Sergeants Major 
Course), and the general officer senior commander (General Officer Senior 
Commanders Course).  These courses present instruction in city management-
like topics grouped under the following five headings:  financial management, 
human resources management, facilities and infrastructure management, 
environmental stewardship, and morale, welfare, and recreation management.   
                                            
79 Garland H. Williams (Colonel), “Welcome to AMSC,” from the Army Management Staff 
College Internet home page; available on the Internet at http://www.amsc.belvoir.army.mil/about/ 
(accessed on March 19, 2008). 
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After the 1996 Khobar Towers attack, AT/FP was added as a sixth topic 
area.  From that time until the 9/11 attacks, only one hour of a three-week long 
(120 hour) Garrison Pre-command Course was dedicated to AT/FP.  This one 
hour consisted of an overview briefing presented by a civilian contractor from the 
Army’s AT/FP office in the Pentagon.  At the time of the 9/11 attacks, the Carlisle 
Barracks garrison commander had limited AT/FP experience, having recently 
graduated from this version of the Garrison Pre-command Course.  His 
command sergeant major had even less, as AT/FP was not a formal part of the 
curriculum in the Garrison Command Sergeants Major Course at that time (nor 
was it included in the General Officer Senior Commanders Course).  
2. Post-9/11 Changes 
As the U.S. reacted to, and recovered from, the 9/11 attacks General 
Abrams, in conjunction with the ongoing Ops Group Echo training efforts, seized 
an opportunity to enhance the amount and quality of individual AT/FP education 
provided to installation and garrison leaders.  As a result of his influence, AMSC 
Command Programs was authorized to recruit an AT/FP subject-matter expert 
(this author) to join its faculty team in early 2002.  At that time, the length of its 
Garrison Pre-command Course was extended by one week and this author was 
assigned to design, develop, and deliver AT/FP curriculum primarily to enhance 
the readiness of garrison commanders to execute their AT/FP responsibilities as 
outlined in the newly updated (January 2002) Army Regulation (AR) 525-13, 
Antiterrorism.  Over the course of a couple of months, the one-hour AT/FP 
briefing evolved into almost 40 hours of additional classes and practical 
exercises focused on the previously discussed Commanders’ Eight Critical 
Antiterrorism Tasks required by AR 525-13.   
Over the past six years, this focus on AT/FP has grown to embrace an all-
hazards approach with emphasis on emergency and consequence management 
for a wide spectrum of situations including severe weather, natural disasters, 
man-made disasters (i.e., terrorist attacks and CBRNE events), and special 
events (e.g., military ceremonies, Olympics and other major sports events, and 
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state funerals, presidential inaugurations, and other political or governmental 
events).  Garrison commanders are instructed in, and engage in discussions on, 
how their installations provide Civil Support to their respective adjacent 
municipalities in support of Homeland Security as well as how those 
municipalities support their installations when necessary.  Guest speakers from 
local, state, and federal levels reinforce classroom discussions on these topics, 
and practical consequence management exercises provide an opportunity for 
garrison commanders to think through their decision-making processes as 
situations unfold in a controlled, non-threatening atmosphere of learning. 
While the Garrison Pre-command Course saw the greatest change in 
curriculum with the additional time and AT/FP and emergency management 
focus, the other courses went through changes of their own as well.  The 
Garrison Command Sergeants Major Course was initially extended by one day, 
then later to two weeks, to provide time to present many of the same classes and 
practical exercises that the garrison commanders receive, so that they can better 
support their garrison commanders during emergency situations.  The General 
Officer Senior Commanders Course remained one-week in length; however, 
some time was carved out of its schedule to include a practical exercise on 
general officers’ installation command responsibilities during emergency 
situations. 
D. INSTALLATION FORCE PROTECTION EXERCISE (IFPEX) PROGRAM 
1. Background 
As previously mentioned, the immediate success of Ops Group Echo in 
identifying gaps in AT/FP readiness, and providing training and exercise 
opportunities for garrison commanders and their staffs to better prepare for, and 
respond effectively to, terrorist attacks or incidents, prompted General Abrams to 
task AMSC Command Programs to replicate the Ops Group Echo experience for 
all Army installations.  AMSC eagerly accepted this challenge, and this author 
was part of the team that designed the Installation Force Protection Exercise 
(IFPEX) Program in accordance with the BCTP and Ops Group Echo models.   
71 
The program concept was turned into a performance work statement 
(PWS) and a contract solicitation went out for bid during the summer of 2002, as 
General Abrams entered retirement.  A contract was awarded in October 2002, 
however, shifting priorities within TRADOC leading up to the invasion of Iraq, 
caused General Abrams’ successor to rescind funding for IFPEX in December 
2002.  Without a funding sponsor and mandate to continue the project, AMSC 
was forced to terminate the IFPEX contract in January 2003, before the first 
seminar ever occurred.   
Undaunted by this funding setback and lack of a senior command sponsor 
for IFPEX, AMSC, in conjunction with the now maturing Installation Management 
Command (IMCOM), leveraged a recent Inspector General (IG) assessment of 
AT/FP shortcomings throughout the Army to convince the Army’s Deputy Chief of 
Staff, Operations (G3) that IFPEX was still a necessary training requirement, 
deserving its full financial support.  In part, the DAIG report noted that “the IFPEX 
program model represents a valuable collective FP training initiative for Army 
installations.  This important Army training program requires immediate emphasis 
to resolve conflicts regarding policy, resource, and training requirements.”80  The 
G3 concurred and agreed to provide sufficient funding to IMCOM to execute the 
IFPEX program through AMSC.  AMSC re-solicited bids from contractors to 
perform the IFPEX mission, eventually awarding a contract in September 2006.   
2. Concept 
Major General John Macdonald, Deputy Commanding General of IMCOM, 
outlines the IFPEX concept as follows:   
Every new Garrison Commander (GC) [participates] in a two-day 
seminar 150-180 days after change-of-command, with a Command 
Post Exercise (CPX) to follow within 60-90 days.  Events are 
tailored to the specific needs of the GC and the conditions at each 
specific site…. I encourage Garrisons to involve local municipal, 
county, and state emergency management, police, fire, and 
medical representatives in IFPEX events.  They are very instructive 
                                            
80 FY2002 Army Antiterrorism Program Inspection (Phase I – Active Army), (Washington, 
DC: Department of the Army Inspector General, March 6, 2003), 5-21. 
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for all participants by enabling them to collectively work the details 
of how to respond to an emergency event as it unfolds, and 
describing and discussing these ideas during training.81 
Although Major General Macdonald’s concept of IFPEX requires every garrison 
commander to participate in a training seminar and follow-on CPX, available 
funding from G3 limited the number of participating installations to 68.  These 68 
IMCOM-selected installations are divided in half, so that 34 installations receive a 
seminar and CPX event in alternating years, allowing most garrison commanders 
to go through the IFPEX experience once as a new commander and again as a 
more seasoned one.   
For smaller installations, Army Reserve centers, and National Guard 
armories not selected to receive the on-site IFPEX Seminar and CPX, a web-
based, exportable force protection training package is available at the AMSC 
Internet web site at http://www.amsc.belvoir. army.mil.  The IFPEX link at this site 
(requires Army Knowledge Online [AKO] access) contains a series of functional 
lessons and scenarios or vignettes that commanders can use to teach and test 
their staffs in a way that mimics the seminars and CPXs.  Some garrison 
commanders have also found this site useful to help them prepare their staffs for 
upcoming IFPEX Seminar and CPX events.  The site content is reviewed and 
updated about every 100 days, so along with providing a training vehicle, it is 
also a great source for obtaining evolving doctrine, lessons learned, best 
practices, and new information. 
The IFPEX seminars provide Garrison Commanders a unique opportunity 
to train with their staffs in a variety of subject areas.  The IFPEX contractor team 
(Team IFPEX) tailors the seminar experience to the needs of the garrison, 
consulting directly with the commander as he/she selects seminar sessions from 
among the following topics (* indicates those selected by Carlisle Barracks): 
• *Installation AT/FP Planning 
• Vulnerability Assessment/Analysis 
                                            
81 “Installation Force Protection (IFPEX) Program,” informational brochure from the Army 
Management Staff College, November 2007.  
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• Intelligence Fusion 
• *Installation Operations Center Operations 
• *Command and Control  for Incident Response 
• Media Relations in Crisis Management  
• Quick Reaction Force (QRF) Operations 
• Communications and Information Assurance  
• Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield 
Explosives (CBRNE) Detection and Survey 
• Personnel and Facility Decontamination 
• *Law Enforcement Rules/Responses 
• Legal Aspects of AT/FP 
• *Medical Force Protection Plans 
• *Response to Accidents, Weather, and Natural Disasters 
• *Five Levels of Crisis Response 
All seminars include two practical exercises and a facilitated After Action Review 
(AAR), providing immediate feedback to the garrison as it prepares for its coming 
IFPEX CPX. 
The IFPEX CPX provides an opportunity for the garrison to demonstrate 
what was learned during the seminar as well as other capabilities sharpened 
during the intervening months since the seminar.  The CPX begins with a 
scenario-driven, all-hazards based exercise tailored to highlight topics that the 
commander previously selected for emphasis during the seminar.  A retired Army 
General Officer serves as Senior Mentor for the CPX, coaching the garrison 
commander and deputy in their responsibilities.  The CPX concludes with 
functional “hot washes” in the areas of command and control; operations, plans, 
and intelligence; logistics, resources and administration; and first responders, 
followed by a collective AAR for the entire garrison command and staff team.  A 
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final written report, to include an overall emergency response performance rating 
on a scale of 1 to 10, is provided to the garrison commander within 30 days after 
the conclusion of the CPX.   
3. Carlisle Barracks 
Carlisle Barracks held its first IFPEX seminar from October 31 to 
November 1, 2007.  In addition to selecting the topics noted above, the garrison 
commander established the following overall goals for the seminar: 
• Assist in building the command and staff team; 
• Focus on command and staff processes; 
• Stimulate thinking about doctrine, AT/FP planning, the complexity 
of crisis response and consequence management, leadership 
styles, and garrison standard operating procedures (SOPs).82 
It was obvious to Team IFPEX that the garrison commander and staff at 
Carlisle Barracks had accomplished much since their Ops Group Echo seminar 
and CPX experience of 2001-02.  At the seminar, Team IFPEX noted that the 
garrison had established memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with several 
municipal agencies and was included in local county emergency management 
support planning.  The garrison has a good severe weather plan for snowstorms 
and is leaning forward in planning for a pandemic flu event.  The team also 
observed effective use of video surveillance across the installation, redundant 
communications means within the Installation Operations Center (IOC), and an 
installation-wide mass notification system for emergencies.   
Unique to Carlisle Barracks is its superb intelligence collection and 
analysis capability, available only because the garrison commander elected to 
dedicate a staff member to this function even though such a duty position does 
not currently exist in the IMCOM Standard Garrison Organization.  This 
intelligence analyst enhances the garrison’s ability to develop and maintain a 
                                            
 –82 Installation Force Protection Exercise (IFPEX), U.S. Army Garrison Carlisle Barracks – 
Final Report, (Fort Belvoir, VA: Army Management Staff College Team IFPEX, March 4, 2008), 
Enclosure 3.   
75 
better common operating picture because he built relationships that resulted in 
effective collaboration with local, state, and federal law enforcement and security 
organizations to obtain relevant intelligence concerning Carlisle Barracks on a 
routine basis.    
At the conclusion of the seminar, Team IFPEX challenged Carlisle 
Barracks to focus on mitigating the 20 identified shortcomings during the weeks 
between the seminar and subsequent CPX. Significant among these 
shortcomings were the following: 
• No Internet connectivity with county emergency management office 
and no workstation for a county liaison officer within the IOC; 
• Lack of integrated training among garrison staff within the IOC; 
• Ineffective SOPs for information management and information 
sharing, particularly casualty tracking; 
• Confusion over proper role of law enforcement dispatch desk 
relative to the IOC during incident response; 
• The need to establish a “battle captain” position within the IOC and 
identify who is to fill that position.83   
Team IFPEX returned to Carlisle Barracks for its CPX, February 20-21, 
2008.  The garrison commander requested two consecutive four-hour CPXs 
rather than the more typical single, six-hour event, and asked that one event 
address a weather emergency and the other a terrorist attack.  Over 25 garrison 
staff participated with their commander in this exercise along with several 
members of the adjacent Cumberland County Emergency Operations Center.  
Because Carlisle Barracks is a small installation, it relies heavily on Cumberland 
County to augment its meager first response capability. 
 
                                            
83 IFPEX, U.S. Army Garrison Carlisle Barracks – Final Report, Enclosure 3.   
76 
The first day’s exercise began at 8:00 a.m. with the National Weather 
Service issuing a tornado warning for the installation and surrounding towns.  At 
8:15 a.m., tornados struck the post, uprooting trees, breaking limbs, and 
damaging private and public property, specifically the post exchange and 
commissary.  Traffic on the U.S. highway just outside the installation’s main 
entrance was slowed due to downed power lines, trees, and malfunctioning traffic 
signals, affecting the flow of emergency response assets from the county to the 
installation.  The garrison’s ability to effectively command and control this crisis 
situation was challenged as the IOC dealt with the resulting casualties, severe 
property damage, jurisdictional concerns, and multi-organizational coordination 
issues at local, state, and federal levels.   
The second day’s exercise continued the scenario, focusing on the 
consequence management activities required to return the installation to normal 
operations.  As this planning and execution was underway, a domestic terrorist 
organization decided to take advantage of the confusion caused by the previous 
day’s natural disaster and detonate a VBIED at the main entrance to Carlisle 
Barracks.  The IOC also received reports that unknown suspicious males were 
seen on the installation and suspicious backpacks were discovered near Root 
Hall, the home of the Army War College.  This attack further challenged an 
already stressed commander and staff with additional mass casualties, more 
property damage, and an intelligence dilemma affecting the security of the 
installation’s main tenant. 
As Team IFPEX conducted its functional hot washes and facilitated the 
final AAR, several garrison strengths emerged from the discussions: 
• Competent, well trained garrison staff with good internal SOPs; 
• Commitment to adopting the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS), demonstrated primarily by organizing the IOC in 
accordance with the Incident Command System (ICS); 
• Superb working relationships with external agencies, especially 
Cumberland County, Pennsylvania; 
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• Significant progress since the seminar in improving the garrison’s 
AT/FP posture through designating a battle captain, effective use of 
intelligence capability, and refinements to achieving a common 
operating picture within the IOC.84 
Challenges the garrison must recognize and attempt to mitigate were also 
identified during Team IFPEX’s facilitated hot wash and AAR discussions: 
• The IOC needs to be relocated into a larger room to optimize its 
functionality during emergency situations; 
• A lack of military resources available to the garrison for FP 
requirements [Carlisle Barracks does not have any large troop 
units in residence, only the senior officer students attending the 
War College.];  
• Close proximity of the local community to installation facilities 
[Carlisle Barracks is immediately adjacent to the town of Carlisle—
there is no stand-off distance between installation perimeter and 
civilian population in town.]; 
• Carlisle Barracks relies almost exclusively on the surrounding 
community [Cumberland County] for first response during a 
crisis.85 
The decision of the garrison commander to conduct two four-hour 
exercises proved to be a great benefit to the IOC staff as it had time after the first 
day’s hot wash discussions to make immediate improvements that affected the 
second day’s performance.  They were better able to identify and track significant 
activities and conduct casualty reporting and tracking with more fidelity.  Update 
briefs were more succinct and useful to the commander.  Information 
management was significantly improved and relations with the media were 
enhanced.  Recalling that the garrison had employed war college students in 
                                            
84 IFPEX, U.S. Army Garrison Carlisle Barracks – Final Report, Enclosure 1.   
85 Ibid.  
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their IOC in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the garrison now has 
plans and training procedures in place to formally integrate student volunteers 
into the IOC when necessary.  By the conclusion of the CPX, Carlisle Barracks 
had demonstrated that it is prepared to respond well to crisis events and Team 
IFPEX rated the garrison’s ability to conduct emergency response operations as 
8 out of 10.   
4. Impact of IFPEX 
In its first 18 months, 40 seminars and 25 CPXs were completed and 
IFPEX has already proven to be extremely successful as a training program for 
garrison commanders and their staffs.  It has served as a forcing function to help 
garrisons design (or improve), and staff Installation Operations Centers (IOCs) 
for emergency response management.  It has caused garrisons to develop new, 
or enhance existing, relationships with municipal first responders, local hospitals, 
and emergency management planners, as well as with state or regional 
Emergency Planning and Liaison Officers (EPLOs), Defense Coordinating 
Officers and Elements (DCOs and DCEs), and other state and federal partners 
(e.g., public health agencies, state bureaus of investigation, and the FBI), all of 
whom have a role in supporting the installation, should it suffer an attack or other 
catastrophic natural or man-made disaster.  These relationships have further 
helped garrisons begin to fulfill the HQDA directive to integrate NIMS and ICS 
into their emergency response planning by identifying challenges that need to be 
worked through concerning command and control, resources, and common 
language and terminology. 
Some trends that have been identified as a result of IFPEX include 
garrison emergency response plans that are not completely executable (usually 
due to faulty planning assumptions that cannot be realized when tested during an 
exercise), shortfalls in intelligence analysis capability (garrisons are not currently 
authorized intelligence analysts, but IFPEX is forcing the issue that they are 
required, using Carlisle Barracks as one example), lack of equipment to enable 
communications compatibility among all first responders and the IOC (again, 
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IFPEX has caused garrisons to look at purchasing radio systems that will 
facilitate communications among military and municipal fire, police, and other 
emergency responders and planners), and difficulty in achieving a common 
operating picture among all participants during a crisis event (IFPEX is prompting 
garrisons to look at web-based software applications like WebEOC to enable 
information sharing and improve situational awareness among IOC staff, first 
responders at the incident command post and incident scene, municipal partners, 
and senior leaders on the installation). 
Perhaps the IFPEX trend with the greatest long-term impact for Army 
installations is one of training.  The IFPEX experience uncovered a need for 
standardized training of directors and other key staff in the Directorate of Plans, 
Training, Mobilization, and Security (DPTMS) within the garrison staff.  Most of 
those occupying this critical staff position have never been formally trained in 
their roles and functions.  This is not to say that they are inexperienced—far from 
it.  Many have been chiefs of Operations sections during past active duty military 
careers, or have had some other type of operations experience that qualifies 
them to perform as a DPTMS director.  However, IFPEX has discovered, as 
evidenced in the many varied ways garrisons conduct emergency operations 
planning and execution (as well as the other functions of the DPTMS), that there 
is no place for a current, or up and coming, DPTMS directors to receive specific 
education and training in this position, so that one might ultimately see 
emergency operations occurring somewhat similarly at various Army garrisons, 
much as one would expect to see infantry, armor, or artillery operations being 
conducted similarly across different brigades throughout the Army.  To address 
this trend, AMSC proposed the development of a two-week course that would 
provide baseline instruction in all the roles, responsibilities, and functions of the 
DPTMS director.  This proposal was accepted jointly by the Commanding 
General of IMCOM and the Director of Training for Headquarters, Department of 
the Army, giving AMSC the green light to proceed.  In January 2008, just 62 days 
after receiving authorization to design the course, AMSC conducted the DPTMS 
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pilot course to 32 students.  The reception given this pilot course by the students 
was phenomenal, and AMSC recently received funding sponsorship from 
IMCOM to add this course to its catalog, providing two offerings each fiscal year 
for 36 students each. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The 9/11 attacks, tragic as they were, came with a silver lining of sorts in 
that the Army has come to recognize and admit openly what it always knew to be 
true—that fences and guards are not enough to protect its installations against 
terrorist attack, or against any other natural or man-made disaster, nor do 
installations have the wherewithal to respond effectively on their own should 
disaster strike.  The doctrine is clear and regulations and policy have been 
published guiding the Army (and other military services) in providing Civil Support 
to state and local authorities during times of crisis, although the advent of the 
Homeland Security mission and cabinet department, as well as the creation of 
U.S. Northern Command caused this doctrine to be modified slightly over the 
past five years or so.  What is less clear, or more precisely, non-existent, is the 
doctrine regarding how Army installations would receive and integrate support 
from local and state officials in response to disasters occurring on the installation.   
The DoD perspective regarding the relationships among Homeland 
Security, Homeland Defense, Civil Support, and Emergency Response has 
provided the basis for the Army to develop doctrine for its installations in 
receiving civil support when required.  The tendency in the absence of doctrine is 
for garrison commanders and staffs to fall back on what most of them are 
comfortable with—their past experience in combat arms or combat support units.  
This will not work effectively over the long term for Army installations.  New 
doctrine is needed that will, by necessity, be radically different from that used in 
the tactical Army.  Army installations must embrace the new National Response 
Framework (NRF) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and 
develop its emergency response doctrine around the common language and 
principles that the Department of Homeland Security has prescribed for all other 
federal, state, and local entities.  This will be a difficult paradigm shift as Army 
garrisons are organized like other military units, but are expected to function like 
cities and counties, for indeed that is what the installation is—the Army’s 
hometown.   
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The Army Management Staff College has been an instrumental catalyst in 
bringing about the changes necessary for garrisons to be successful in 
integrating their existing Antiterrorism and Force Protection missions with the 
Homeland Security concept mandated by the president after the 9/11 attacks.  
Through its on-campus Command Programs’ courses for senior installation 
leaders and the on-site IFPEX program for garrison staffs, the message is being 
delivered and understood that while fences are a necessary part of securing an 
Army installation, they should not be a barrier to effective partnership between 
the garrison and the local municipal entity.  As the IFPEX program matures, one 
could expect to see more elaborate exercises involving an installation and 
municipal operations center operating in tandem with an incident command post 
at the scene of a simulated disaster.  One might also see improved 
communications and coordination of effort and resources between installation 
and municipality, perhaps even a staff exchange program where persons 
performing similar functions in each organization switch places for 30 days to 
help gain a better understanding of how each organization contributes to the 
success of the other.   
Sooner, rather than later, the issue of doctrine must be addressed.  The 
Army Management Staff College, given the proper personnel and resources, 
would be the proper organization to accomplish this daunting task.  As an 
academic organization, it is removed from the day-to-day operations tempo that 
has heretofore prevented IMCOM from drafting this doctrine itself.  However, the 
close relationship AMSC has with IMCOM headquarters and the garrisons keeps 
AMSC well grounded so as to avoid the “ivory tower” mentality that often 
pervades academic institutions.  As this emergency management doctrine is 
developed, it could be readily evaluated and corrected with the aid of over 100 
senior installation leaders that attend AMSC’s Command Programs courses each 
year.   
The Army has made great improvements in its force protection posture 
over the past decade since the Khobar Towers attack and is in the process of 
integrating homeland security with force protection.  In the seventh year since the 
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9/11 attacks, complacency is one of our greatest threats.  This must be 
countered with continued action and progress, even when an immediate threat is 
not evident.  We would be wise to heed the words of Confucius:  
The superior man, when resting in safety, does not forget that 
danger may come.  When in a state of security he does not forget 
the possibility of ruin.  When all is orderly, he does not forget that 
disorder may come.  Thus his person is not endangered, and his 
States and all their clans are preserved.86  
 
                                            
86 Quote from “The Quotations Page,” available on the Internet at http://www.quotationspage. 
com/subjects/security/ (accessed on March 23, 2008). 
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